UID:
almafu_9959232431102883
Format:
1 online resource (x, 296 pages) :
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map
ISBN:
0-674-03889-4
Series Statement:
Harvard historical monographs ; 64
Content:
The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France’s military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation and why they failed. As critic Michael Hurst writes in The American Historical Review, " The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness."
Note:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
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Frontmatter --
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Acknowledgments --
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Contents --
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Tables --
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Introduction --
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1. France at the End of the War --
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2. Foch and the Disjunction of Diplomacy and Military Planning --
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3. Petain and Parliament: The Formulation and Passage of French Military Legislation --
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4. From the Ruhr to Locarno via Morocco --
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5. To the Maginot Line --
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6. Epilogue, 1930-1940 --
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Selected Bibliography --
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Index
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-674-89310-7
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-674-02386-2
Language:
English
DOI:
10.4159/9780674038899
