UID:
almafu_9959233099202883
Format:
1 online resource (553 p.)
ISBN:
3-11-032707-4
Series Statement:
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ; Bd. 22
Content:
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of
Note:
Description based upon print version of record.
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Frontmatter --
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Acknowledgments --
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Note --
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Table of Contents --
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Introduction --
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Endnotes to Introduction --
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Chapter One: Self as Substance --
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Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance --
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Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism --
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Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems --
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Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self --
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Bibliography --
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Index of Names --
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Backmatter
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Issued also in print.
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 3-11-032668-X
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-299-72512-0
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9783110327076
