UID:
edocfu_9960963303502883
Format:
1 online resource.
ISBN:
0-19-067703-1
,
0-19-067704-X
Series Statement:
Philosophy of mind
Content:
The first half of this text argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.
Note:
Previously issued in print: 2017.
,
The reality of consciousness -- Against physicalism -- What is physicalism? -- The knowledge argument -- The conceivability argument -- Revelation and the transparency argument -- Russellian monism: an alternative -- The elegant solution -- Panpsychism versus panprotopsychism, and the subject-summing problem -- Top-down combination problems -- A conscious universe -- Analytic phenomenology: a metaphysical manifesto.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-19-067701-5
Language:
English
