Online Resource
Berlin : Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Format:
1 Online-Ressource (44 Seiten)
ISSN:
1860-5664
Series Statement:
2010,7
Content:
Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained.
Language:
English
URN:
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100111203
URL:
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