Format:
graph. Darst., Lit. S. 97
ISSN:
0003-0554
Content:
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision I procedure for the majority allows the minority to "enforce" its favoured outcome even when overruled by a majority. "Special" voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of Lani Guinier's arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation, benefitting everyone. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
In:
American political science review, New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1906, 93(1999), 1, Seite 85-97, 0003-0554
In:
volume:93
In:
year:1999
In:
number:1
In:
pages:85-97
Language:
English
