Format:
1 Online-Ressource
ISBN:
9781786432339
Series Statement:
The international library of critical writings in economics 358
Content:
Recommended readings (Machine generated): 20. Kenneth J. Arrow (1969), 'Values and Collective Decision-Making', in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society: Third Series, Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 215-32 -- 21. Amartya Sen (1995), 'Rationality and Social Choice', American Economic Review, 85 (1), March, 1-24 -- 22. Amartya Sen (1997), 'Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice', in Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Social Choice Re-examined, Volume 1: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Held at Schloss Hernstein, Berndorf, near Vienna, Austria, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 15-37 -- 23. Kotaro Suzumura (2002), 'Introduction to Social Choice and Welfare', Banca D'Italia Temi Di Discussion Del Servizio Studi, 422, March, 1-45 -- 24. Knut Wicksell (1958) 'A New Principle of Just Taxation', in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 72-118 -- 25. John Rawls (1957), 'I. Justice as Fairness', Journal of Philosophy, 54 (22), October, 653-62 -- 26. James M. Buchanan (1964), 'What Should Economists Do?', Southern Economic Journal, 30 (3), January, 213-22 -- 27. John Rawls (1999), 'The Main Ideas of the Theory of Justice', in A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Chapter 1, Section 3, Cambridge, MA, USA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 10-15 -- 28. James M. Buchanan (1977), 'Notes on Justice in Contract ', in Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist, College Station, TX, USA: Texas A&M University Press, 123-34 -- 29. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1985), 'The Contractarian Vision', in The Reasons of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 19-32 -- 30. Russell Hardin (1988), 'Review Article: Constitutional Political Economy: Agreement on Rules', British Journal of Political Science, 18 (4), October, 513-30 -- 31. Viktor J. Vanberg (1994), 'Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints: The Normative Element in Classical and Contractarian Liberalism', in Rules and Choice in Economics, Part VI, Chapter 13, London, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 208-34, references -- 32. Georg Vanberg and Viktor Vanberg (2017), 'Contractarian Perspectives in Law and Economics', in Francesco Parisi (ed.), 'The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1, Methodology and Concepts', Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 246-67 -- 33. Friedrich A. Hayek (1960), 'Economic Policy and the Rule of Law', in The Constitution of Liberty, Chapter 15, Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press, 220-33, references -- 34. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), 'A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions', in The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Part II, Chapter 6, Ann Arbor: MI, USA: University of Michigan Press, 63-84, references -- 35. Franz Böhm (1989),'Rule of Law in a Market Economy', in Alan T. Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution, New York, NY, USA: St. Martin's Press, 46-67 -- 36. Gilbert W. Nutter (1968), 'Economic Welfare and Welfare Economics', Journal of Economic Issues, 2 (2), 166-72 -- 37. Rutledge Vining (1984), 'Three Main Concepts That Inhere In The Circumstances Cited' and 'Concluding Remarks upon What an Economic System is, and the Problem of Specifying Norms of the Outcome of its Working', in On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System, Chapter 1 and Chapter 6, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 3-33, 170-81, references -- 38. James M. Buchanan (1987), 'The Constitution of Economic Policy', American Economic Review, 77 (3), June, 243-50
Content:
39. Helmut Leipold (1990), 'Neoliberal Ordnungstheorie and Constitutional Economics: A Comparison between Eucken and Buchanan', Constitutional Political Economy, 1 (1), December, 47-65 -- 40. James M. Buchanan (1995), 'Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioural Feasibility', Rationality and Society, 7 (2), April, 141-50 -- 41. Viktor J. Vanberg (2005), 'Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy', Journal of Institutional Economics, 1 (1), June, 23-49
Content:
This important research literature review discusses some of the most prominent literature in the field of individual choice and economic welfare. It analyses material exploring how economics as a scientific enterprise may inform political decision-making. The premise is explored paradigmatically through different interpretations including utility-individualism in the context of welfare economics, preference-individualism in social choice theory, and choice-individualism in constitutional economics. The review covers the foundational literature as well as contemporary pieces, which have sparked further discussion in the field. This review will be valuable to researchers and scholars alike as well as to all those gravitating towards this fascinating topic
Note:
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
,
Includes bibliographical references
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781786432322
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Vanberg, Viktor, 1943 - Choice and economic welfare Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 ISBN 9781786432322
Language:
English
Keywords:
Wohlfahrt
;
Übersichtsarbeit
;
Aufsatzsammlung
DOI:
10.4337/9781786432339
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
Author information:
Vanberg, Viktor 1943-
