Format:
1 online resource (390 pages)
ISBN:
9781400835591
Content:
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
Content:
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- PART 1. VOTING PROCEDURES -- 1. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Background -- 1.3. Early History -- 1.4. The Adoption Decisions in the Societies -- 1.5. Does AV Make a Difference? -- 1.6. Does AV Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? -- 1.7. Is Voting Ideological? -- 1.8. Summary and Conclusions -- 2. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Preferences and Strategies under AV -- 2.3. Election Outcomes under AV and Other Voting Systems -- 2.4. Stability of Election Outcomes -- 2.5. Summary and Conclusions -- Appendix -- 3. Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Definitions and Assumptions -- 3.3. Preference Approval Voting (PAV) -- 3.4. Fallback Voting (FV) -- 3.5. Monotonicity of PAV and FV -- 3.6. Nash Equilibria under PAV and FV -- 3.7. The Effects of Polls in 3-Candidate Elections -- 3.8. Summary and Conclusions -- 4. Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Background -- 4.3. Controlled Roundings -- 4.4. Further Narrowing: The Search May Be Futile -- 4.5. Constrained Approval Voting (CAV) -- 4.6. Unconstraining Votes: Two Alternatives to CAV -- 4.7. Summary and Conclusions -- 5. Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Minisum and Minimax Outcomes -- 5.3. Minimax versus Minisum Outcomes: They May Be Antipodes -- 5.4. Endogenous versus Restricted Outcomes -- 5.5. Manipulability -- 5.6. The Game Theory Society Election -- 5.7. Summary and Conclusions -- Appendix -- 6. Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Obstacles to the Implementation of Proportional Representation (PR) -- 6.3. Integer Programming -- 6.4. Monroe's System.
Note:
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780691133218
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780691133218
Language:
English
URL:
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kxp/detail.action?docID=485783
