Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    College Station : Texas A&M University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1696620775
    Format: 1 online resource (226 pages)
    ISBN: 9781603447720
    Series Statement: Foreign Relations and the Presidency v.11
    Content: In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the "photo gap": five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration's handling of the Soviet Union's surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of "another U-2 incident" (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba-thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key
    Content: Front Cover -- Title Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: The Making of a "Photo Gap": August 29 to October 14, 1962 -- Chapter 2: Obscuring the Photo Gap -- Chapter 3: The Struggle over the Postmortems -- Chapter 4: Stonewalling the House -- Chapter 5: The Senate Steps In -- Chapter 6: Tensions within the Kennedy Administration: Fashioning a -- Chapter 7:End of the Trail: The "Interim" Report -- Chapter 8: The Costs of Managed History -- Appendix: A Historiography of the Photo Gap, 1963-2011 -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Back Cover.
    Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources , Front Cover; Title Page; Contents; Chapter 3: The Struggle over the Postmortems; Introduction; Chapter 1: The Making of a "Photo Gap": August 29 to October 14, 1962; Chapter 2: Obscuring the Photo Gap; Chapter 4: Stonewalling the House; Chapter 5: The Senate Steps In; Chapter 6: Tensions within the Kennedy Administration: Fashioning a; Chapter 7:End of the Trail: The "Interim" Report; Chapter 8: The Costs of Managed History; Appendix: A Historiography of the Photo Gap, 1963-2011; Acknowledgments; Notes; Bibliography; Index; Back Cover;
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781603447683
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781603447683
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages