ISBN:
9780444500632
Content:
We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a “mechanism” to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature – such as the Nash implementation theorem, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism, and the Arrow/d’Aspremont–Gerard–Varet mechanism – and consider their implications for the environment, in particular the reduction of aggregate emissions of pollution. We consider the cases of both complete and incomplete information.
In:
Handbook of environmental economics, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2003, (2003), Seite 305-324, 9780444500632
In:
0444500634
In:
0444500634
In:
year:2003
In:
pages:305-324
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1016/S1574-0099(03)01012-X
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)