UID:
almafu_9958096936402883
Format:
xvi, 342 pages :
,
illustrations ;
,
27 cm.
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-281-78755-8
,
9786611787554
,
0-8213-7612-8
Series Statement:
WBI development studies
Content:
In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This volume brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies in section III demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversigh
Note:
Description based upon print version of record.
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Contents; Foreword; Introduction; I. OVERVIEW; Table 1.1 The Tools of Legislative Oversight; Table 1.2 Use of Oversight Tools, by Number of Respondents; Table 1.3 Number of Legislative Oversight Tools Used by Surveyed Countries; Table 1.4 Tools of Legislative Oversight, by Form of Government; Table 1.5a Number of Legislative Oversight Tools, by Form of Government and Country; Table 1.5b Number of Oversight Tools, by Form of Government; Table 1.6 Number of Oversight Tools, by Income Level; Table 1.7 Use of Committee Hearings, by Income Level
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Table 1.8 Use of Hearings in Plenary Sittings, by Income LevelTable 1.9 Use of Questions, by Income Level; Table 1.10 Use of Question Time, by Income Level; Table 1.11 Use of Interpellation, by Income Level; Table 1.12 Use of Committees of Inquiry, by Income Level; Table 1.13 Presence of Ombudsman as Oversight Tool, by Income Level; Table 1.14 Number of Oversight Tools, by Level of Democracy; Annex Table 1 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Formally Democratic; Annex Table 2 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Liberal Democratic
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Table 2.1 Correlation Analysis of Level of Democracy and Oversight ToolsTable 2.2 Logistic Regression, with Formal Democratic Status as a Dependent Variable; Table 2.3 Logistic Regression, with Liberal Democracy as a Dependent Variable; Table 2.4 Oversight Tools, Income Level, and Democracy; Table 2.5 Oversight Tools, Income Level, and Democracy in Africa; Table 2.6a Number of Oversight Acts in Italy's Legislature-Chamber of Deputies, 1976 to 2001; Table 2.6b Number of Oversight Acts from the 7th to the 13th Italian Senate; Table 2.7a The Upward Trend in Oversight Acts-Chamber of Deputies
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Table 2.7b The Upward Trend in Oversight Acts-SenateTable 2.8a Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Chamber; Table 2.8b Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Senate; Table 2.9a Interpellations Addressed to the Foreign Affairs Ministry from the Chamber of Deputies; Table 2.9b Interpellations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Senate; Table 2.10 Effectiveness of Oversight Tools in the 14th Legislature; Table 2.11 Logit Models, with Oversight Tools and Democracy; II. OVERSIGHT AND THE BUDGET PROCESS
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Figure 3.1 Heart of Executive-Legislative Relations: The Budget ProcessBox 3.1 Brazilian Congress and the Budget Process; Box 3.2 Ghana's Parliament and Introducing Value Added Tax; Table 3.1 Legislatures' Powers to Amend the Budget; Box 3.3 The Polish Parliament's Budget Research Office; Figure 3.2 Fiduciary Obligation; Box 3.4 Enhancing Financial Transparency by Broadening Access to Information; Box 3.5 Analyzing the Political Context; Figure 4.1 Model of a Controlled Process; Table 5.1 Spearman Correlations between Indices; Figure 5.1 Index of Legislative Budget Institutions
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Table 5.2 Comparison of Budget-Amending and Non-Budget-Amending Legislatures
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-8213-7611-X
Language:
English
Keywords:
Aufsatzsammlung
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
URL:
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-7611-9
