Format:
1 Online-Ressource (157 Seiten)
Edition:
2014
ISBN:
9783110372656
,
9783110377286
Content:
Main description: The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant’s conception of intuition and contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content. It is argued that intuition provides the most basic form of intentionality – pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.
Content:
Biographical note: Anna Tomaszewska is a researcher at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków. She specializes in Kantian philosophy and philosophy of mind.
Note:
Dissertation Jagiellonian University in Kraków 2011
,
FrontmatterContentsAcknowledgementsIntroduction1 The Contents of Perceptual Experience: Opposing Views2 Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian?3 Kant on Nonconceptual Content: Sensations and Intuitions4 Kant on Concepts in Experience5 Nonconceptual Content and Transcendental Idealism6 Kant and Naturalism about the MindConclusionBibliographyIndex.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110372649
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110372649
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Tomaszewska, Anna The Contents of Perceptual Experience Warsaw : De Gruyter Open, 2014 ISBN 3110372649
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110372649
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9783110372649
Language:
English
Subjects:
Philosophy
Keywords:
Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
;
Mentalismus
;
Hochschulschrift
DOI:
10.2478/9783110372656
DOI:
10.2478/978311037265
URL:
Volltext
(kostenfrei)
URL:
Volltext
(Open Access)