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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845868284
    Format: Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451850867 , 9781451850864
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 99/86
    Content: This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable—but not fully credible—governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments. The model predicts that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function as tests on Italian, Irish, Belgian, and Danish data show
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Prati, Alessandro Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999 ISBN 9781451850864
    Language: English
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