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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845869000
    Format: Online-Ressource (46 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451865414 , 9781451865417
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/281
    Content: This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board''s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Berger, Helge Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006 ISBN 9781451865417
    Language: English
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