Umfang:
Online-Ressource (30 p)
Ausgabe:
Online-Ausg.
ISBN:
1451874707
,
9781451874709
Serie:
IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 01/208
Inhalt:
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers
Weitere Ausg.:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Baqir, Reza Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001 ISBN 9781451874709
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.5089/9781451874709.001
