UID:
almafu_9959691493902883
Format:
1 online resource (xvii, 204 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-316-28774-2
,
1-316-32191-6
,
1-316-30853-7
,
1-316-32859-7
,
1-316-32525-3
,
1-316-33193-8
,
1-316-31855-9
,
1-139-13545-7
Series Statement:
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Content:
One of the classic problems in social science is known as 'the dilemma of the commons', in which land, water, and other resources held jointly by social or economic segments tend to be depleted sooner and to a greater extent than privately held assets. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many aspects of western European society changed fundamentally, including the abolition of common-property rights, which in itself was related to social and economic shifts in that same society. This book intends to put the debate on commons, commoners, and the disappearance of both throughout early modern and modern northwestern Europe in a new light, through new approaches and innovative methodologies. Tine De Moor aims to link the historical debate about the long-term evolution of commons to the present-day debates on common-pool resources, as well as touching upon various disciplines within the social sciences that work on commons issues.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Half-title page; Series page; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Epigraph; Contents; Figures and Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 The emergence of commons and other forms of institutions for collective action in western Europe from the late Middle Ages onwards1; 1.1 An institutional revolution in western Europe?; 1.2 Historical development: the rise of commonsand guilds from 1000 to 1300; 1.3 Distinct institutions for collective action; 1.4 The design of institutions for collectiveaction; 1.4.1 Exclusive
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1.4.2 Self-governed and relatively democratic governance structure1.4.3 Protectionist; 1.4.4 Local; 1.4.5 Features of the governance model versus featuresof successful institutions; 1.5 Explaining the origins of institutions for collectiveaction in western Europe; 1.5.1 Motives for collective action: potential advantagesof cooperation; 1.5.2 Motors of institutions for collective action: stimulating factorsto form collectivities; 1.5.3 Conditions for collective action: weak family ties, tolerantstates, and legal recognition; 1.6 Conclusions; 2 Common land and common rights inFlanders1
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2.1 Description of the area2.2 The nature of common land; 2.2.1 Common waste; 2.2.1.1 Common pasture; 2.2.1.2 Common meadow; 2.2.1.3 Common woodlands; 2.2.2 Common arable land; 2.3 The evolution of the legal basis of common land; 2.4 Management of common land in Flanders21; 2.4.1 Boundaries of common land; 2.4.1.1 Basic conditions of access to the common; 2.4.1.2 Supplementary conditions for access to common land; 2.4.2 Regulation of the use of common land; 2.4.3 Managers and monitors of common land; 2.5 Conclusions; 3 From rules to practice: case description, sources, and methodology
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3.1 Case study: the common of the Gemene and Loweidenin the villages of Assebroek and Oedelem, Flanders3.1.1 The rights and duties of the aanborgers; 3.1.2 Historial sources on the case of the Gemene and Loweiden; 3.2 Methodological framework: the functioning of a common captured in a three-dimensional approach; 4 The choices of the commoners: understanding utility, efficiency, and equity on the commons through the behavior ofcommoners; 4.1 The commoners' changing participation in use and managementof the common; 4.2 The effect of changing power balances on the managementof the common
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4.3 Dealing with overand under-exploitation4.4 Keeping it in common: the choice between collective andprivate property; 4.5 Conclusions; 5 Dealing with dilemmas: conclusions; Epilogue: The revenge of history?: The return of homo cooperans in present-day western European countries; References; Archival references; Index
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-316-64582-7
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-02216-9
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139135450
