Format:
1 online resource (213 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9780521808187
,
9780511157196
Content:
Analyses the institutions that guide the behaviour of people involved in the implementation of foreign aid programmes and how this affects effectiveness of aid in recipient countries. Drawing on the literature of institutional and organizational economics, the book explores the informational problems in aid delivery, making some suggestions for reform
Note:
Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Foreword -- 1 Introduction -- 1. THE SETTING -- 2. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND AGENCY THEORY -- 3. SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN AID ORGANISATIONS -- Multiple principals and objectives -- A broken information feedback loop -- The institutional reform dimension -- 4. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES IN THE FOREIGN AID DELIVERY CHAIN -- Performance incentives inside aid agencies -- Moral hazard in donor-contractor-recipient relations -- From de jure to de facto institutional reform in recipient countries -- The role of evaluation in foreign aid performance -- 5. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES -- 2 Conflicts of objectives and task allocation in aid agencies -- 1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM -- 2. MULTIPLE AGENTS AND MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS -- The costs of delegation -- Hierarchy -- The chain of delegation -- Intermediaries to enhance strategic credibility -- Manipulation by intermediaries -- Joint delegation -- Co-ordination -- Commitment to the agent's incentives -- Ineffciency as an ex post threat -- Economies of scope -- A contrasting problem: multiple tasks -- 3. A MODEL OF MULTIPLE TASKS -- 4. A MODEL OF MULTIPLE TALENTS -- 5. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES -- 3 The interactions of donors, contractors, and recipients in implementing aid for institutional reform -- 1. THE GENERAL CONTEXT -- 2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A MODEL: AN OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROJECTS -- The product -- The actors -- 3. MODELLING THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AID RECIPIENTS -- Definitions and assumptions -- Contractual arrangements -- 4. THE FOUR EQUILIBRIA -- 5. COMPARING EQUILIBRIA -- The parties 'rankings of outcomes under interest-group and embedded scenarios -- Some intermediate conclusions -- 6. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARATIVE STATICS -- Comparative statics 1: introducing evaluation
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5 The role of evaluation in foreign aid programmes -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE EVALUATION OF TRANSFERS -- 3. FOREIGN AID TRANSFERS AND AID AGENCIES -- The demand for foreign aid -- Politicians -- The suppliers -- A digression into consultants' markets -- The aid agency -- 4. THE QUALITY OF EVALUATIONS -- 5. MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS AND OBJECTIVES -- 6. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES -- 6 Some policy conclusions regarding the organisations involved in foreign aid -- 1. GENERAL ISSUES -- 2. SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF AID AGENCIES -- Bilateral agencies -- Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) -- Multilateral agencies -- The European Commission as multilateral aidagency -- Index
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Comparative statics 2: introducing donor country NGOs -- Comparative statics 3: contractor capture of the donor agent -- Comparative statics 4: the recipient agent influences the donor agent's views of the contractor -- 7. SEPARATING EMBEDDED AND INTEREST GROUP PROJECTS -- Example 1: minimising the effects of interest groups -- Example 2: aiming for an optimum allocation of limited aid funds -- 8. CASE STUDIES -- Case study 1: the consequences of using the contractor to blunt the influence of interest groups -- Case study 2: the importance of project governance when there is embeddedness -- Case study 3: Haste makes waste when it affects the control of projects -- 9. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED -- REFERENCES -- 4 Embedding externally induced institutional reforms -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME -- Economic interests -- Informal institutions -- 3. DIRECT INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT -- A general perspective on the framing of institutions and the likelihood of conflict -- The effectiveness of formal institutions -- The likelihood of direct conflict between formal and informal institutions -- The prescriptiveness of formal market institutions -- Substantive market law -- Law of property -- Supplementary laws and regulations -- The prescriptiveness of social norms and scenarios of direct conflict -- Prescriptiveness of social norms and the structure of social networks -- The impact of legitimacy on the relationship between formal and informal institutions -- 4. INDIRECT INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT -- The concept of market compatibility -- The impact of restraining social norms in combination with fragmented societies -- 5. THE STABILITY OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS -- Factors influencing social norms to change -- Destabilising effects of formal institutions on social norms -- 6. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- REFERENCES
Additional Edition:
Print version Martens, Bertin The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2002 ISBN 9780521808187
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
URL:
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