Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 online resource (693 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521119979 , 9780511672019

Series Statement: Cambridge International Trade and Economic Law Series v.Series Number 3

Content: The final defence in WTO dispute settlement is authorised, state-to-state retaliation that governments can implement against trading partners. Despite being critical to dispute settlement, little is known about its operation. This volume brings together legal, economic and political perspectives on the topic from academics and practitioners involved in these actions

Note: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of tables and figures -- Contributors -- Introduction: Trade retaliation in WTO dispute settlement: a multidisciplinary analysis -- 1 'Trade retaliation is shooting yourself in the foot' (reciprocity versus welfare -- definition of nullification -- choice of counterfactual) -- 2 'Trade retaliation simply does not work when developing countries win a case' (informal remedies -- the WTO enforcement club -- smart sanctions -- cross-retaliation) -- 3 'Accurately calculating the authorized level of retaliation is a myth and close to impossible' -- Part I Background and goal(s) of WTO retaliation -- 1 The nature of WTO arbitrations on retaliation -- 1 Novelties in the WTO dispute settlement system -- 2 Third-party adjudication in the DSU implementation phase -- 3 WTO arbitrations during the implementation phase: legal versus non-legal disputes -- lawyers versus non-lawyers -- 4 Specific features of WTO arbitration on the level of retaliation -- 2 The calculation and design of trade retaliation in context: what is the goal of suspending WTO obligations? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 What could be the goal(s) of WTO suspension? -- 3 Why does the goal of WTO suspension matter? -- 4 How can we figure out the intended goal(s) of WTO suspension? -- 5 The historical evolution of the goal(s) of trade suspension from GATT to WTO -- 6 Statements in WTO arbitration reports as to the goal(s) of WTO suspension -- Phase 1: induce compliance (albeit with equivalent suspension) -- Phase 2: inducing compliance requires more than equivalent suspension ('appropriate countermeasures' in response to prohibited subsidies) -- Phase 3: identity crisis and doubt as to the goal of WTO suspension in regular DSU cases -- Conclusion on WTO arbitration case law -- 7 Proposition A: suspension in the GATT/WTO has variable goals , (i) Description of the approach -- (ii) Justification of the approach -- (b) Other approaches -- 5. Magnitude III: the commensurate standard in serious prejudice cases -- 6. Form: the disciplines on cross-retaliation -- (a) Overview: no hop, one hop, two hops -- (b) Scope of review -- (c) Practicability and effectiveness -- (d) 'Circumstances are serious enough' -- (e) Matters to be taken into account -- 7 The purpose of retaliation -- Conclusion -- Comment on chapter 4 -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Article 22.6 of the DSU: still in the early stages of development -- 3 Choice of metric for assessing nullification or impairment: the punishment should fit the crime -- 4 The choice of counterfactual: the arbitrators temporary solution must be WTO-consistent -- 5 Institutional considerations: improving the information available to arbitrators -- 5 From Bananas to Byrd: damage calculation coming of age? -- The issue -- 1 The arbitrators' choice to make their own calculation of the amount of countermeasures -- 2 The bold yet generally prudently applied concept of 'inducing compliance' -- 3 The use of economic models and data, and its limits -- 4 The reliance on trade loss as a benchmark for nullification or impairment -- 5 The form of countermeasures -- Conclusion -- PART III An economic assessment after ten arbitration disputes -- 6 The economics of permissible WTO retaliation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Bagwell-Staiger theory of trade agreements and the "reciprocity approach" -- 3 WTO disputes and retaliation over import-restricting measures -- 3.1 Import tariffs -- 3.1.1 Actual DSu arbitrations over import tariffs -- 3.2 Import quotas -- 3.2.1 Actual DSU arbitrations over import quotas: EC-Bananas, EC-Beef Hormones, and US-Internet Gambling -- 3.3 Non-tariff measures on imports that violate national treatment , 1 Introduction: the EC's experience and the objectives of trade sanctions -- 2 The cases in which the EC applied sanctions -- (a) Retaliation against safeguards: the Wheat Gluten and Steel disputes -- (b) US-Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) -- (c) US-Byrd Amendment -- 3 Cases in which the EC has so far not applied sanctions -- (a) US-1916 Act -- (b) US-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act (the Irish music case) -- (c) US-Section 211 of the omnibus Appropriations Act (havana Club) -- 4 Tentative lessons -- (a) Sanctions applied by the EC -- (b) Sanctions applied against the EC -- 5 A few additional remarks -- (a) Terminology -- (b) The difference between the suspension of WTO obligations and the actual sanctions -- (c) The need for appellate review of arbitration decisions under Article 22.6 -- (d) The US-Gambling arbitration: a judicial disaster -- (e) Retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement and conventions administered by the WIPO -- 10 The politics of selecting trade retaliation in the European Community: a view from the floor -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Splitting the bill -- 3 Non-contractual liability -- 4 The 'long list' approach -- 5 But ... -- References -- 11 Canada's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations -- 12 Is retaliation useful? Observations and analysis of Mexico's experience -- 1 Some observations -- 1.1 Observation one: only some portions of the chocolate cake were taken into account for retaliation (Byrd) -- 1.2 Observation two: there was no negotiation on compensation (Byrd) -- 1.3 Observation three: compliance came late, notwithstanding the strength of the co-complainants (Byrd) -- 1.4 Observation four: rules on early retaliation were followed by earlier compliance (Brooms) -- 1.5 Observation five: the selection of goods subject to retaliation involved consideration of the impact on domestic consumers (Byrd and Brooms) , 1.6 Observation six: an amicable approach was preferred to retaliation (Bananas) , 3.3.1 Actual DSU arbitrations over NTMs on imports that violate national treatment: US-Antidumping Act of 1916 -- 3.4 Domestic subsidies to import-competing firms -- 3.4.1 Actual DSU arbitrations over domestic subsidies to importcompeting firms: US-Continuing Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) -- 4 WTO disputes and retaliation over export-promoting measures -- 4.1 Export subsidies in a three-country model -- 4.1.1 Actual DSU arbitrations over export subsidies and third country effects: Canada-Aircraft Subsidies, Brazil-Aircraft Subsidies, and US-Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) -- 4.2 Export subsidies in a two-country model -- 4.2.1 Actual and potential DSU arbitrations over export subsidies in a twocountry model: US-Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) -- 4.2.1 Actual and potential DSU arbitrations over export subsidies in a twocountry model: US-Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) -- 5 Other issues -- 5.1 Imperfectly competitive markets: strategic trade policy -- 5.2 Non-political shocks -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Comment on chapter 6 -- References -- 7 Sticking to the rules: quantifying the market access that is potentially protected by WTO-sanctioned trade retaliation -- Introduction -- 1 Further motivation provided by elements of the existing literature -- 2 Empirical implementation -- 3 Concluding remarks -- References -- PART IV The domestic politics and procedures for implementing trade retaliation -- 8 The United States' experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 US procedures for suspension of concessions -- 3 US Suspension of tariff concessions in Hormones and Bananas -- EC-Bananas -- EC-hormones -- EC-Biotech: proposed suspension of concessions -- 4 Analysis and conclusion -- 9 The European Community's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations , 8 Proposition B: equivalent suspension can (and normally does) induce compliance largely because it can be tailor-made and is combined with reputation and community costs -- 9 Proposition C: optimal protection of WTO entitlements is variable protection -- 10 Conclusion -- Comment on chapter 2 -- Appendix Policy underpinnings of international juridical institutions -- Comment on chapter 2 -- 3 Extrapolating purpose from practice: rebalancing or inducing compliance -- Our hypotheses -- Complainant practice -- Conclusion: extrapolating purpose from practice -- PART II A legal assessment after ten arbitration disputes -- 4 The law of permissible WTO retaliation -- Introduction -- 1 Basic features of the WTO enforcement mechanism -- (a) The sole remedy for continuing non-compliance is retaliation -- (b) Collective retaliation is not envisaged -- (c) Retaliation is subject to multilateral disciplines on form and magnitude -- (d) Retaliation is temporary -- (e) Retaliation does not respond to non-compliance occurring before the expiry of the RPT -- 2. The process -- (a) The initial request for authorisation to retaliate -- (b) The Article 22.6 arbitration process -- (i) Mandate of the arbitrator -- (ii) Burden of proof -- (iii) Precedential effect of prior awards -- (c) The post-award request for authorisation to retaliate -- (d) Ensuring that retaliatory measures remain within the bounds of DSB authorisation -- (e) Termination of retaliatory measures -- 3. Magnitude I: the general equivalence standard -- (a) The equality-of-harm approach -- (i) Calculation of nullification and impairment arising from the underlying violation -- (ii) Calculation of nullification and impairment arising from retaliatory measures -- (b) Other approaches -- 4 Magnitude II: the appropriateness standard in prohibited subsidies cases -- (a) The amount-of-subsidy approach

Additional Edition: Print version Bown, Chad P. The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2010 ISBN 9780521119979

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

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