Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 online resource (500 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9781107006010 , 9781139099691

Content: Taking their cue from Karl Polanyi's critique of the 'disembeddedness' of the market from society, in this book experts from a wide range of disciplines explore the effect of integrating markets and converging policy strategies on corporate governance, finance and labor market regulation

Note: Cover -- The Embedded Firm -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Contributors -- 1 Introduction: corporate governance after the 'end of history': investigating the new 'great transformation' -- Thematic overview -- Theoretical perspectives -- Conclusion -- Part I Historical trajectories of business and regulation -- 2 Corporate governance and financial crisis in the long run -- I Introduction -- II Shareholder value: an aberration in the evolution of corporate law? -- III Shareholder value and corporate failure: from Enron to the crisis of 2008-2009 -- IV Corporate governance after the crisis -- V Conclusion -- 3 Financialism: a (very) brief history -- 4 Legitimating power: the changing status of the board of directors -- I Introduction -- II Trust -- III Representation -- IV Legitimacy -- V Epilogue -- 5 Engaging corporate boards: the limits of liability rules in modern corporate governance -- I Introduction -- II Foundational corporate governance concepts in the United States -- III A brief sketch of the evolution of US corporate governance -- A Boards of directors in the age of managerialism -- B Social forces that destroyed the manageralist model of corporate governance -- IV Board engagement and the directors' duty to be attentive -- V Conclusions -- 6 The primacy of Delaware and the embeddedness of the firm -- I Introduction -- II The first wave: drawing the distinction -- III The second wave: event studies and the attempts to settle the Cary-Winter debate -- IV The third wave: post-Enron -- V Lessons from the Delaware debate -- 7 The new embeddedness of the corporation: corporate social responsibility in the knowledge society -- I Introduction -- II The death of contract and the rise of finance -- A Corporations and finance -- B Transformations of capitalism and the law -- C Crisis - what crisis? , B Market regulators start questioning the fundamentals -- C What do the current evaluations by market regulators teach us? -- IV Market fundamentalism and governance systems -- V Network systems as inspiration in the development of reflective capitalist models -- A Alternative governance systems -- B The Dutch corporate governance system: an example of network interaction -- C The implications of network thinking -- VI Integrating social values and reflectivity into capital market regulation -- VII Conclusion -- 18 Why executive pay matters to innovation and inequality -- I Inequitable and unstable economic growth -- II Maximizing shareholder value -- III Speculation and manipulation in the explosion of executive pay -- IV Stock buybacks as "weapons of value destruction" -- V Fighting financialization -- 19 Products, perimeters and politics: systemic risk and securities regulation -- I Introduction -- II The politics of international financial regulation -- III What is systemic risk anyway? -- IV The role of IOSCO in defining systemic risk -- Recent IOSCO deliberations on systemic risk in a transnational context -- V Implications of systemic risk for securities regulation -- VI Conclusion: IOSCO, soft law and international financial governance -- 20 Modernizing pension fund legal standards for the twenty-first century -- I Introduction -- II Mutual economic reliance between pension investors and corporations -- III Market changes have created a "lemming" fiduciary standard -- IV Improving pension fund governance -- V Alignment of interests among agents and service providers -- VI Six recommendations -- VII Conclusion -- Part V Conclusion -- 21 Conclusion: evaluation, policy proposals and research agenda -- Index , D Re-embedding capitalism? -- III Industrial organization and corporate governance (paradigm 1) -- A The corporation and its stakeholders -- B The corporation in a welfarist 'mixed economy' -- C Beyond right and left? -- IV What makes and what comes after financial capitalism? (paradigm 2) -- V What managers do depends on what they know (paradigm 3) -- A The place of knowledge in management -- B From individuals to organizations to networks? From industrial captains to managerial revolutionaries to the 'end' or 'future' of management? -- C The corporation as state: corporate social responsibility in the knowledge society -- D What is the knowledge society? -- Part II New interests, new shareholder constellations, new landscapes -- 8 Beyond the Berle and Means paradigm: private equity and the new capitalist order -- I Introduction -- II PE's worldview -- III How do private equity funds work? -- The magic of leverage -- IV The problem with the public corporation -- Today's agency school -- V The labor-left counter-attack -- "Financialization" or pluralism redux? -- VI Conclusion: the real nature of private equity -- 9 Pension funds as owners and as financial intermediaries: a review of recent Canadian experience -- I Acting like owners? -- II Background to Canadian pension funds -- A Sources of revenues of pension funds -- B Investment patterns of pension funds -- III Factors driving change -- A Size and concentration -- B Public and private sector plans -- C Demographics -- D Changing legal and regulatory environment -- E Economic theory -- IV Implications for pension funds as owners and financial intermediaries -- A Monitoring and control -- B Depth, liquidity, price and volatility -- C Alternative assets and the real and paper economies -- V Conclusions -- 10 Credit derivatives market design: creating fairness and sustainability -- I Introduction , II Credit derivatives, distinguishing risk management tool from speculative market -- III Principal-agency issue -- IV Shifting externalities -- V Central counterparty clearing facilities -- VI Recommendations for point of purchase and sale -- VII Financial distress of the reference entity and implications for restructuring -- VIII Recommendations at the point of settlement and insolvency restructuring proceedings -- 11 The EU Takeovers Directive: a shareholder or stakeholder model? -- I Introduction -- II Background to the Directive -- III Board neutrality/level playing field -- IV Duty to employees -- V Information to employees -- VI Payments to employees -- VII Impact of ESOPs -- VIII Conclusion -- 12 "Law and finance": inaccurate, incomplete, and important -- I Introduction -- II The view from economic sociology: law as a partial view -- A Complementarities matter -- B The difficulty of transplantation and the reality of translation -- C The relationship of law and politics -- D Ownership structures - dispersed is not necessarily optimal -- E Future research -- III Why is LLSV nonetheless important? -- A LLSV and the World Bank's Doing Business Initiative -- B LLSV and the promotion of shareholder-oriented corporate governance -- IV Conclusion -- Part III Labor's evolution in the new economy -- 13 Labor and finance in the United States -- I Introduction -- II Labor and financial development since 1980 -- A Wealth ownership -- B Financial occupations -- C Risk -- D Corporate governance -- III Origins of modern financial development -- IV Financial development in the past -- V The double movement in the past -- VI Double movement redux -- A Pay issues -- B Board reforms -- C Proxy access -- VII Private equity and hedge funds -- VIII Conclusion -- 14 The conflicting logic of markets and the management of production -- I Introduction , II The growth of "worker capital" -- III Corporate governance and labor management -- IV Efficiency in productive systems: cooperation and labor management -- V Dominant stakeholders and cooperation -- VI Globalization and effective regulation -- VII Conclusions -- 15 Organizing workers globally: the need for public policy to regulate investment -- I Introduction -- II The growing inequality of income -- III Enforceable rules for the global labor market -- IV Guaranteeing fundamental human rights at work -- V The "social dimension" of investment agreements -- VI More effective rules for multinational enterprises -- VII Building international industrial relations -- VIII Using market and investor power -- IX The growth of financialization -- X Conclusion -- 16 From governance to political economy: insights from a study of relations between corporations and workers -- I Introduction -- II Employee interests and corporate governance -- A Employees as 'citizens at work' -- B Employees as 'stakeholders' -- C Employees as 'human capital' -- D Employees as investors -- III Political economy of the firm: cooperation and solidarity/divergence and conflict -- A Management -- B Workers and unions -- C The corporation and 'others' -- D The political economy of the corporation -- IV Re-imagining corporate governance as political economy: seven hypotheses -- Hypothesis 1 -- Hypothesis 2 -- Hypothesis 3 -- Hypothesis 4 -- Hypothesis 5 -- Hypothesis 6 -- Hypothesis 7 -- V Conclusion -- Part IV The transnational embedded firm and the financial crisis -- 17 The intellectual foundations of the global financial crisis: analysis and proposals for reform -- I Introduction -- II How mainstream economics led to market fundamentalism -- III Deregulators as critics of deregulatory market theory -- A Self-interest does not protect the market

Additional Edition: Print version Williams, Cynthia A. The Embedded Firm Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2011 ISBN 9781107006010

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

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