Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Umfang: 1 online resource (1036 pages)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9781107004429 , 9781139203371

Inhalt: National oil companies (NOCs) play an important role in the world economy. They produce most of the world's oil and bankroll governments across the globe. This book explains the variation in performance and strategy for NOCs and provides fresh insights into the future of the oil industry

Anmerkung: Cover -- Oil and Governance -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Boxes -- Contributors -- Acknowledgements -- PART I Introduction -- 1 Introduction and overview -- 1 Introduction -- 2 NOCs in history -- 3 Surveying the scholarship on NOCs -- 3.1 Why form an NOC? -- 3.2 Why maintain an NOC? -- 3.3 How do governments and NOCs interact? -- 3.4 What explains the variation among NOCs? -- 4 This study -- 4.1 The "dependent variables": what we seek to explain -- 4.2 The "independent variables": factors that may explain performance and strategy -- 4.3 Units of analysis and case selection -- 5 The rest of this book -- Notes -- PART II Thematic studies of national oil companies -- 2 The political economy of expropriation and privatization in the oil sector -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Previous literature on expropriation and privatization -- 2.1 Why do countries expropriate private industry? -- 2.1.1 Incentives for expropriation -- 2.1.2 Constraints on expropriation -- 2.2 Why do countries privatize nationally owned companies? -- 2.3 Unanswered questions -- 3 Theory -- 3.1 Expropriation and nationalization decisions -- 3.2 Privatization decisions -- 4 Research design: data and methods -- 4.1 Data -- 4.1.1 Dependent variables -- 4.1.2 Explanatory variables -- 4.1.3 Control variables -- 4.2 Methods -- 5 Empirical findings -- 5.1 Expropriations in the oil sector -- 5.2 NOC privatization -- 6 Case studies -- 6.1 Expropriation -- 6.2 Privatization -- 7 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Notes -- 3 Hybrid governance: state management of national oil companies -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background on NOC governance -- 2.1 NOC governance within the principal-agent model -- 2.2 NOC governance as corporate governance -- 2.3 NOC governance as public administration -- 2.4 NOC governance as regulation -- 3 Testing links between NOC governance and performance , 2 History and background of Iranian oil and gas -- 2.1 The history of hydrocarbons in Iran13 -- 3 Relationships between NIOC and the Iranian state -- 4 NIOC's performance and strategy -- 4.1 Explaining NIOC's poor performance -- 4.2 Explaining NIOC's poor performance: external factors -- 4.3 Explaining NIOC's poor performance: internal factors -- 5 Conclusion -- Notes -- 7 Handcuffed: an assessment of Pemex's performance and strategy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A short history of Pemex -- 2.1 Origins and early years (1938-1974) -- 2.2 Pemex after 1974 -- 3 Explaining Pemex's strategy and performance -- 3.1 Relationship with the Mexican government -- 3.1.1 The executive -- 3.1.2 The congress -- 3.1.3 The bureaucracy -- 3.2 Finances -- 3.2.1 Taxes -- 3.2.2 Subsidies -- 3.2.3 Investment financing - Pidiregas -- 3.3 Corporate operations and internal relationships -- 3.3.1 Investment priorities -- 3.3.2 Internal relationships and the union -- 3.3.3 A vocally unhappy management -- 3.4 Relationships with contractors and IOCs -- 3.5 Technology and human capital -- 4 The prospects for reforms -- 8 Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC): an enterprise in gridlock -- 1 Introduction -- 2 History of KPC -- 3 KPC's current organization, performance, and strategy -- 3.1 KPC's performance -- 3.1.1 Effects of fiscal system on performance -- 3.1.2 Operational costs and performance -- 3.1.3 Labor-related performance -- 3.1.4 Natural gas performance -- 3.1.5 Effect of non-core obligations on performance -- 3.1.6 Technological performance -- 3.2 KPC's strategy -- 3.3 KPC's relationship with government -- 3.3.1 Project Kuwait -- 3.3.2 Regulation and competition -- 4 Conclusion -- Notes -- 9 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC): a balancing act between enterprise and government -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview and history of the Chinese oil industry , 2.1 Overview of the Chinese oil industry -- 2.1.1 Oil production and reserves -- 2.1.2 Energy demand and consumption -- 2.2 History of the Chinese oil industry -- 2.2.1 The beginning -- 2.2.2 Reforming CNPC -- 3 The state-CNPC relationship -- 3.1 Who controls CNPC? -- 3.1.1 Corporate governance and control over senior managers -- 3.2 The state-CNPC relationship as a reflection of the process of economic liberalization in China -- 3.2.1 The relationship between CNPC and PetroChina -- 3.2.2 The decision to "go abroad" -- 3.2.3 Subsidies -- 4 Financial indicators of firm performance -- 5 Conclusion -- Notes -- 10 Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA): from independence to subservience -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Historical background on the Venezuelan oil sector -- 2.1 The foundations of the Venezuelan oil sector (1910-1958) -- 2.2 Creeping nationalization (1958-1976) -- 2.3 A private business under government control (1976-1982) -- 2.4 PDVSA goes abroad (1982-1989) -- 2.5 Foreign investors move in (1990-1999) -- 2.6 Transition to firmer state control (1999-2003) -- 2.7 PDVSA partially transformed (2003-today) -- 3 Explaining the state-PDVSA relationship -- 3.1 Natural resources: oil-dependent government, investment-dependent company -- 3.1.1 Plentiful oil resources -- 3.1.2 Costly, dirty oil -- 3.1.3 Long investment cycles -- 3.1.4 Off-the-radar natural gas -- 3.2 State capacity: an oil company fills the state's gaps -- 3.2.1 The missing Venezuelan state -- 3.2.2 Tax policy in a rudderless policymaking environment -- 3.3 State goals: major shifts over time -- 3.3.1 Pre-Chávez era: stability reigns (mostly) supreme -- 3.3.2 Early Chávez era (1999-2002): transition in state goals -- 3.3.3 Later Chávez era (2003-present): state goals expand -- 3.4 Effect of other factors on the state-PDVSA relationship -- 4 Explaining PDVSA's strategy and performance , 3.1 Research methods -- 3.2 Hypotheses -- 3.3 Analysis -- 4 Implications -- 4.1 Organization of state actors having significant authority over the NOC -- 4.2 Mix of NOC oversight mechanisms -- 4.3 Rule of law in NOC governance -- 5 Conclusion -- Appendix: detailed research findings -- Notes -- 4 On the state's choice of oil company: risk management and the frontier of the petroleum industry -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The constraint of risk -- 2.1 Defining risk -- 2.2 Petroleum state motives and choices -- 2.3 The nature of petroleum risks -- 2.4 The task of risk management in petroleum -- 2.5 Company type and capacity to manage risk -- 2.5.1 The international oil companies -- 2.5.2 The national oil companies -- 2.5.3 The oil service companies -- 2.6 Risk and the state's choice of agent -- 3 Testing the idea that risk constrains state choice of oil company -- 3.1 The nationalizations of the early 1970s -- 3.2 The North Sea -- 3.3 Global patterns of oil and gas exploration, 1970-2008 -- 4 Conclusion -- 4.1 The influence of non-risk factors on agent choice -- 4.2 Industry structure and the next frontier -- Notes -- PART III National oil company case studies -- 5 Saudi Aramco: the jewel in the crown -- 1 Introduction and overview -- 2 The accidental NOC -- 3 Saudi Aramco's relationship with the government -- 3.1 Regulating the oil sector -- 4 Governance and strategy -- 4.1 Human capital -- 4.2 Strategy and investment choices -- 4.2.1 Oil -- 4.2.1.1 Recovery rates and reserves -- 4.2.1.2 Production capacity -- 4.2.1.3 Production -- 4.2.1.4 Marketing -- 4.2.1.5 Downstream - domestic -- 4.2.1.6 Downstream - abroad -- 4.2.2 Gas -- 5 Saudi Aramco's performance -- 6 Conclusion and the future of Saudi Aramco -- Notes -- 6 Oil, monarchy, revolution, and theocracy: a study on the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) -- 1 Introduction , 3.3 Algerian state capacity: fuzzy lines between Sonatrach and the state , 4.1 PDVSA strategy: from autonomy to partial accommodation -- 4.1.1 Seeking autonomy (1976-2002) -- 4.1.2 Switch to compliance (2003-today) -- 4.2 PDVSA performance: success, then decay -- 4.2.1 World-class performer (1976-2002) -- 4.2.2 Transformation brings inefficiency (2003-present) -- 5 Conclusion -- Notes -- 11 Awakening giant: strategy and performance of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) -- 1 Introduction -- 2 History -- 2.1 UAE as member of OPEC -- 2.2 UAE's unique approach to nationalization -- 3 Operations and management of ADNOC group of companies -- 4 Strategy and performance -- 5 ADNOC and the state -- 5.1 At the margins: projects outside the ADNOC sphere -- 5.1.1 Dolphin Gas Project -- 5.1.2 Stranded fields: Conoco enticed to work sulfur gas fields and then abandons the project -- 6 Conclusion -- Notes -- 12 Brazil's Petrobras: strategy and performance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The strategy for success -- 2.1 State monopoly -- 2.2 Organizing the downstream (1954-1973) -- 2.3 Developing the offshore (1974-1994) -- 2.4 Deregulation (1995-2008) -- 3 Explaining Petrobras's performance: the relationship between the state and the NOC -- 3.1 The principal's perspective -- 3.2 The agent perspective -- 4 Conclusion -- Notes -- 13 Sonatrach: the political economy of an Algerian state institution -- 1 Introduction: overarching themes -- 2 Historical overview and natural resources: Sonatrach and Algeria -- 2.1 Historical overview -- 2.2 Nature of resources: copious gas, limited oil -- 2.2.1 Algeria's natural gas industry -- 2.2.2 Algeria's oil industry -- 3 Sonatrach and the Algerian state: joined at the hip -- 3.1 Organization of the Algerian hydrocarbons sector: blurring the lines between company and state -- 3.2 Algerian state goals: the push-pull between modernization and control

Weitere Ausg.: Print version Victor, David G. Oil and Governance Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2011 ISBN 9781107004429

Sprache: Englisch

Schlagwort(e): Electronic books

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