Format:
1 online resource (158 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9781107015432
,
9781139218238
Content:
This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes, although it criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest
Note:
Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1. Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons -- 1.1. What are preferences? -- 1.2. Overall and total comparative evaluations -- 1.3. Preferences, reasons, and folk psychology -- 1.4. Misconceptions concerning preferences -- 1.5. Conclusions -- Part I: Preferences in Positive Economics -- 2. Preference Axioms and Their Implications -- 2.1. The axioms of ordinal utility theory -- 2.2. Implications of the axioms for the understanding of preferences -- 2.3. Rationality and preferences -- 2.4. Preferences and self-interest -- 3. Revealed-Preference Theory -- 3.1. Actual revealed preferences and the revelation theorem -- 3.2. Critique of actual revealed-preference theory -- 3.3. Why not redefine preferences in terms of choice? -- 3.4. Hypothetical revealed preferences -- 3.5. Belief-dependent revealed preferences -- 3.6. Conclusions -- 4. Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism -- 4.1. Total subjective comparative evaluations -- 4.2. Using preferences to predict and explain choices: The standard model -- 4.3. Expected-utility theory -- 4.4. What does expected-utility theory accomplish? -- 4.5. Consequentialism and standard choice theory -- 4.6. Attributes and preferences -- 4.7. Conclusions -- 5. Game Theory and Consequentialism -- 5.1. Games and outcomes -- 5.2. Consequentialism in game theory -- 5.3. The default principle -- 5.4. Conclusions: The consequences of consequentialism -- 6. Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice -- 6.1. Sympathy and commitment -- 6.2. Commitment and counterpreferential choice -- 6.3. Constraints and counterpreferential choice -- 6.4. Many concepts of preference or just one? -- 6.5. Game theory and counterpreferential choice -- 6.6. Commitments and intentions -- 6.7. Conclusions
,
Part II: Preferences, Welfare, and Normative Economics -- 7. Preference Satisfaction and Welfare -- 7.1. Welfare and preferences -- 7.2. Why welfare is not preference satisfaction -- 7.3. Welfare and laundered preferences: The approximation rationale -- 7.4. Why the approximation view fails -- 7.5. Conclusions -- 8. Preferences in Welfare Economics -- 8.1. Preferences and welfare: An evidential view -- 8.2. The evidential view and the scope of cost-benefit analysis -- 8.3. Preference distortions and paternalism -- 8.4. Conclusions -- Part III: Psychology, Rational Evaluation, and Preference Formation -- 9. The Psychology of Choice -- 9.1. Loss aversion, framing, and the endowment effect -- 9.2. Reversals, variance, and adaptation -- 9.3. Belief-desire psychology -- 9.4. Explaining and predicting preferences and choices -- 10. Constructing Preferences -- 10.1. How people evaluate alternatives -- 10.2. How people ought to evaluate alternatives -- 10.3. An example: Health-state values -- 10.4. Emotions and rational evaluation -- 10.5. Hume's challenge -- 10.6. Coherence -- 10.7. Conclusion: Theories of preference formation -- 11. Conclusions -- References -- Index
Additional Edition:
Print version Hausman, Daniel M. Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare New York : Cambridge University Press,c2011 ISBN 9781107015432
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
URL:
FULL
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