Umfang:
1 online resource (268 pages)
Ausgabe:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9781107016330
,
9781139612203
Inhalt:
Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. This book explains such failure and proposes an approach to facilitate better reform results in developing country governments
Anmerkung:
Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- ONE Change Rules, Change Governments, and Develop? -- Square Peg Reforms in Round Hole Governments -- Institutional Reforms Are New and Pervasive -- Institutional Reforms Are Similar, Even in Different Contexts -- Prominent Indicators Reinforce Reform Agendas -- Institutional Reforms Produce Mixed, and Often Disappointing, Results -- Reforms with Varied Results and the Rest of This Book -- Two Deconstructing the Puzzling Evidence of Reform -- Reforms with Limited Results -- Institutional Reforms Do Have Varied Impacts -- Common Arguments Do Not Explain Varied and Poor Results -- Mixed Results and the Quantity and Quality of Reform -- Mixed Results and the Context and Time of Reform -- A New Perspective on This Puzzling Evidence -- A View on Argentinas Reforms -- Reform Signaling in Bolivia, Benin, Niger, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Georgia -- Viewing Reforms as Signals Helps Explain Puzzling Evidence -- Three Overlooking the Change Context -- If It Werent for Context -- When Context Is Overlooked, "History Repeats Itself" in Reforms -- Introducing Hard Budget Constraints in Argentina -- Combating Corruption in Malawi -- How Institutional Contexts Impact Institutional Reforms -- Complex Institutional Structures Always Exist -- Institutional Icebergs in Argentina -- Institutional Icebergs in Malawi -- Multiple Institutional Structures Always Exist -- Multiple Structures in Argentina -- Multiple Structures in Malawi -- Context Shapes Change Opportunities -- How Context Affected Change in Argentina -- How Context Affected Change in Malawi -- External Reformers Commonly Overlook Context -- Evidence of Overlooked Context in Argentina and Malawi -- Getting Serious about Context -- four Reforms as Overspecified and Oversimplified Solutions -- Reform Is a Complicated Thing
,
Problem-Driven Learning Reveals Contextual Complexities -- Problem-Driven Learning Motivates Deinstitutionalization -- Problem-Driven Learning Yields New Solutions -- Institutional Reforms Can Be Improved through Problem-Driven Learning -- Eight Finding and Fitting Solutions That Work -- Reforms Can Be Relevant -- Reforms Can Be Found and Fitted to Context -- Rwandas Decentralization Reforms -- Indonesias Corruption Eradication Commission -- How Reforms Are Found and Fitted through Purposive Muddling -- Finding and Fitting Takes Time and Is Incremental -- Finding and Fitting Requires a Relevant, Localized Focus -- Finding and Fitting Requires Broad Scanning and the Bricolaged Formation of Hybrids -- Hybrids Instead of Best Practice Solutions -- Carriers, Translators, and Experimentation -- Institutional Reforms Can Be Improved through Purposive Muddling -- NINE Broad Engagement, Broader (and Deeper) Change -- Convening and Connecting for Change -- Institutional Change Comes with Help -- Agency at the Start of Reform -- Agency in Reform Implementation -- Broad Engagement, through Mobilization, Facilitates Broad Change -- Change Requires Multiple Agents Providing Multiple Functions -- The Importance of Mobilizing Functions from Agents -- The Role of External Agents in Change Processes -- Reform through Broadly Mobilized Agents -- Ten Reforming Rules of the Development Game Itself -- Is Change Possible in the Development Game? -- A Summary of This Books Argument -- How Much Change Should One Expect in the Development Community? -- Disruption in the Institutional Reform Field -- Dominant and Alternative Mechanisms in the Institutional Reform Field -- Agents of Change in the Institutional Reform Field -- Conclusion: Tipping the Scale in Favor of Change -- References -- Index
,
The Problem of Overspecified, Oversimplified Reform -- Explaining the Failure of Complex Reforms -- A Bias toward High-Content Best Practice Reforms -- The Best Practice Bias in African Accounting Reforms -- Reforms Do Not Provide All of the Pieces for Best Practice Interventions -- Evidence of Content Gaps That Reforms Do Not Fill -- Unfilled Gaps and Failed Reforms -- Evidence of Unfilled Gaps and Failed Reforms -- Getting More Flexible - and Specific - about Content -- FIVE Limited Engagement, Limited Change -- The Illusory Promise of "Champions" -- The Problem of Limited Reform Engagement -- Agency and Institutional Reform -- Multiagent Leadership Fosters Change (Not Solitary Leaders) -- Multiagent Leadership in Mozambique -- Deconcentrated or Distributed Agents Must Also Be Engaged -- Mozambiques Distributed Agents and Diffusion Problem -- The Narrow Emphasis on Champions -- External Influence and the Narrowness of Engagement in Mozambique -- Getting Inclusive about Agency -- Six Expecting Reform Limits in Development -- What You See Is Frequently Not What You Get in Reform -- Reforms That Only Make States Look Better -- What Reform Limits Should Be Expected, and Why? -- Decoupling and the Limits of Isomorphic Change -- How Visibility and Core-Ness Shape Change Possibilities -- How Agency Type and Location Shape Change Possibilities -- Decoupling and the Limits of Isomorphic Change in African PFM -- Expecting Limits to PFM Reforms -- Testing the Propositions: Is Decoupling a Part of PFM Reform Reality? -- Expecting Reforms That Are about Form, Not Function -- seven Problem-Driven Learning Sparks Institutional Change -- When Reforms Solve Problems -- Problems, Flexibility, and the Contextual Constraints of Health Sector Reform -- How Problem-Driven Learning Fosters Contextually Relevant Reforms
Weitere Ausg.:
Print version Andrews, Matt The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development New York : Cambridge University Press,c2013 ISBN 9781107016330
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Electronic books
URL:
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