UID:
almafu_9958096161202883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xix, 282 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Ausgabe:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-107-30179-3
,
1-107-30289-7
,
1-107-30587-X
,
1-107-30688-4
,
1-139-34382-3
,
1-107-30908-5
,
1-107-31243-4
,
1-299-00910-7
,
1-107-31463-1
Serie:
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Inhalt:
Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Introduction and overview -- Electoral manipulation: definition, measurement, and a snapshot -- The puzzle of excessive and blatant manipulation -- More than winning: information and the consequences of electoral manipulation -- The strategic logic of electoral manipulation -- The theory at work: evidence from case studies -- Indirect effects of electoral manipulation: quantitative evidence -- Conclusion.
,
English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-44868-9
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-03054-4
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139343824
