UID:
almahu_9949386240002882
Umfang:
1 online resource (ix, 231 pages) :
,
illustrations.
ISBN:
9781003052401
,
1003052401
,
9781000179026
,
1000179028
,
9781000179002
,
1000179001
,
9781000179019
,
100017901X
Serie:
Routledge studies in epistemology
Inhalt:
"This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons influences perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism. The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics"--
Anmerkung:
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- PART I The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons -- 1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework -- 1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated Introduction -- 1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality -- 1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States to Competences -- 1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons to Possessed Justifying Reasons -- 2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
,
2.1 The Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification -- 2.2 Analyzing Dispositions and Disposition Ascriptions -- 2.3 Propositional and Doxastic Justification: A Dispositional Analysis -- 3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation -- 3.1 The Problem of the Basing Relation -- 3.1.1 Acting for a Reason and the Problem of Causal Deviance -- 3.1.2 The Problem of Causal Deviance and the Epistemic Basing Relation -- 3.2 Dispositions and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains -- Appendix: Propositionalism: Normative and Motivating Reasons -- PART II Perceptual Reasons
,
4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience -- 4.1 Nondoxastic Justification: A Rough Sketch of the Territory -- 4.2 Internalism and Externalism: The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience -- 4.2.1 Some Externalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Burge on Perceptual Entitlement -- 4.2.2 Some Internalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Dogmatism and Conservatism -- 5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification -- 5.1 Wright's Conservative Account of the Value of Perceptual Experience -- 5.2 Deontological Justification and Conservatism -- 5.2.1 Deontological Conservatism
,
5.3 Deontological Conservatism vs. (Some) Other Conservative Views -- 5.3.1 Entitlement to Trust a Source of Information -- 5.3.2 Full-Blooded Entitlement -- 6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons -- 6.1 Challenging Dogmatism: Divorcing the Rational and the Justified -- 6.2 Defending Internalism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons -- 6.2.1 Belief: Accessing Reasons in Doxastic Terms -- 6.2.2 Experience: Accessing Reasons in Nondoxastic Terms -- 6.3 Dogmatism and the Challenge of Cognitive Penetration -- PART III Consequences
,
7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat -- 7.1 Taxonomy of the Defeaters: Rebutters and Undercutters -- 7.2 The Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat -- 7.3 Higher-Order Evidence and State-Given Reasons -- 8 The Nature of Inference -- 8.1 The Nature of Inference: Problems and Proposals -- 8.2 The Dispositional Account of Reason-Possession and the Taking Condition -- 8.2.1 Logical Knowledge -- 8.2.2 Reasons and Reasoning -- 9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions -- 9.1 The Perceptual Model: The Epistemic Value of Emotions
Weitere Ausg.:
Print version: Vahid, Hamid, 1959- The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons New York and London : Routledge, 2020. ISBN 9780367509866
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Electronic books.
;
Electronic books.
DOI:
10.4324/9781003052401
URL:
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003052401
