UID:
almafu_9960943600702883
Umfang:
1 online resource (84 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Ausgabe:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-009-11769-6
,
1-009-11789-0
,
1-009-10418-7
Serie:
Cambridge elements. Elements in public and nonprofit administration,
Inhalt:
Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments, too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 21 Nov 2022).
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9781009108386
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009104180
