UID:
almafu_9960840943802883
Format:
1 online resource (84 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-009-02022-6
,
1-009-02042-0
,
1-009-00614-2
Series Statement:
Cambridge elements. Elements in public economics
Content:
Why is an understanding of political competition essential for the study of public economics and public policy generally? How can political competition be described and understood, and how does it differ from its strictly economic counterpart? What are the implications of the fact that policy proposals in a democracy must always pass a political test? What are the strengths and weaknesses of electoral competition as a mechanism for the allocation of economic resources? Why are tax structures in democratic polities so complicated, and what implications follow from this for normative views about good policy choice? How can we measure the intensity of political competition, why and how does it vary in mature democracies, and what are the consequences? This Element considers the approach to answer these questions, while also illustrating some of the interesting theoretical and empirical work that has been done on them.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Sep 2022).
,
Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Political Competition and the Study of Public Economics -- Contents -- 1 Political Economy in the Study of Public Policy -- 1.1 A Brief Outline -- 1.2 Limiting the Scope of Our Inquiry -- 2 Thinking Generally about Economic and Political Competition -- 2.1 Approaches to the Nature of Political Competition: Objectives, Process, and Location -- 2.2 A Prelude: Contrasting Elements in the Study of Economics and Politics -- 2.2.1 Consumers versus Voters -- 2.2.2 Firms versus Parties -- 2.2.3 Markets versus Elections -- 3 Electoral Competition and Economic Welfare -- 3.1 What Standard of Reference? -- 3.2 A First Theorem for Competitive Political Economies -- 3.2.1 A Representation Theorem -- 3.2.2 Some Implications of an Equilibrium Framework for Policy Analysis -- Efficient Redistribution and the Identification of Inefficient Policies -- A Challenge for Second-Best Analysis -- Political Feasibility in Policy Design and Advocacy -- 3.2.3 Political Feasibility, Tectonic Policies and Schumpeterian Competition -- 4 What Can Go Wrong? -- 4.1 Problems Due to the Behavior of Voters -- 4.2 Problems Due to the Nature of Political Parties -- 4.3 Problems Due to the Differences between Markets and Elections -- 4.3.1 International Competition -- 4.3.2 Special Interest Politics -- 4.3.3 The Common Pool Problem -- Decentralization, Yardstick Competition, and Foot Voting -- 5 Fiscal Structure -- 5.1 Tax Structure as a Sorting Equilibrium -- 5.2 Dealing with Complexity -- 6 Political Competitiveness -- 6.1 Measures of Competitiveness -- 6.1.1 Competitiveness as Unpredictability or Closeness -- 6.1.2 Competitiveness and the Asymmetry of Safe Seats -- 6.1.3 Competitiveness as the Incumbent's Probability of Loss -- 6.1.4 Contestability -- 6.1.5 Responsiveness -- 6.1.6 Measuring Competitiveness between Elections.
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6.2 Does It Matter? -- 6.2.1 Swing Voters and Economic Growth -- 6.2.2 Implications for Government Size and Procurement Efficiency -- 6.2.3 Political Competition and the Business Cycle -- 6.2.4 Competitiveness and the Private/Public Composition of the Public Expenditure -- A Last Comment -- 7 Conclusion -- Appendix: Further Issues Concerning Behavior, Equilibrium, and the Degree of Competition -- References -- Acknowledgments.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781009001694
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009006149
