UID:
almahu_9949383410702882
Format:
1 online resource
ISBN:
9780429286018
,
0429286015
,
9781000023343
,
1000023346
,
9781000023275
,
1000023273
,
9781000023206
,
1000023206
Series Statement:
Routledge studies in trust research
Content:
In today's world, we cooperate across legal and cultural systems in order to create value. However, this increases volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity as challenges for societies, politics, and business. This has made governance a scarce resource. It thus is inevitable that we understand the means of governance available to us and are able to economize on them. Trends like the increasing role of product labels and a certification industry as well as political movements towards nationalism and conservatism may be seen as reaction to disappointments from excessive cooperation. To avoid failures of cooperation, governance is important - control through e.g. contracts is limited and in governance economics trust is widely advertised without much guidance on its preconditions or limits. This book draws on the rich insight from research on trust and control, and accommodates the key results for governance considerations in an institutional economics framework. It provides a view on the limits of cooperation from the required degree of governance, which can be achieved through extrinsic motivation or building on intrinsic motivation. Trust Control Economics thus inform a more realistic expectation about the net value added from cooperation by providing a balanced view including the cost of governance. It then becomes clear how complex cooperation is about 'governance accretion' where limited trustworthiness is substituted by control and these control instances need to be governed in turn. Trust, Control, and the Economics of Governance is a highly necessary development of institutional economics to reflect progress made in trust research and is a relevant addition for practitioners to better understand the role of trust in the governance of contemporary cooperation-structures. It will be of interest to researchers, academics, and students in the fields of economics and business management, institutional economics, and business ethics. Note that this work is the first of its kind that explicitly reflects on the societal realities, how these drive the assumption setting process, and how these assumptions influence the theory outcome.
Note:
Cover; Half Title; Series; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1. The Problem of Governing Cooperation; 1.2. The Need for a Framework to Economize on Governance Devices; 1.3. Structure of the Book; 2 Understanding of Trustworthiness as an Intrinsic Institution; 2.1. Trust: Expected Trustworthy Behavior; 2.1.1. Encapsulated Interest as the Rational Choice Account of Trust; 2.1.2. The Leap of Faith Account and Trust Propensity; 2.1.3. Transaction Cost Economics and the Rationality of Trust; 2.1.4. Agency Theory, Asymmetric Agency and Entrusting
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2.2. Control: Non-Opportunism and Other Institutions2.2.1. Non-Opportunism as a Feature of Trustworthiness; 2.2.2. Non-Opportunism as an Intrinsic Institution; 2.2.3. Opportunism and Empirical Conditions of "Conventional" Institutions; 2.3. On the Interplay of Trust and Control; 2.3.1. Substitutes vs. Complements; 2.3.2. Negative Indirect Effects: Crowding Out; 2.3.3. Positive Indirect Effects: Crowding In; 2.3.4. Framing Determining Sign of Indirect Effect; 3 The Proposed Heuristic; 3.1. "Trust Control Economics" as a Theoretical Framework
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3.1.1. Theoretical Underpinnings and Choice of Host Discipline3.1.2. Revisiting the Assumption Set; 3.1.3. Trust Control Economics; 3.1.4. On the Distinction Between Extrinsic and Intrinsic Governance; 3.2. The "Extended Trust Sentence" as Pattern of Trust Relations; 3.2.1. Recognizing the Empirical Conditions of the Trustee; 3.2.2. Recognizing Control as an Element of Circumstances: "Trustworthiness Accretion"; 3.2.3. Social Capital, Enforcement Capital and Trustees Trading in Freedom; 3.2.4. The Negative Extended Trust Sentence
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3.3. The "Game of Trust and Control" as Application in Practice3.3.1. Introduction; 3.3.2. Building the Game; 3.3.3. Possible Formalization of Non-Opportunism; 3.3.4. On the Notion of Control; 4 Use-Test of the Game of Trust and Control; 4.1. Calibration of the Non-Opportunism Parameter in Practice; 4.2. Information Intermediaries; 4.2.1. General Aspects; 4.2.2. Information Intermediaries Within the Primary Game; 4.2.3. On Sources for Indirect Signals/Cues; 4.2.4. On the Information Intermediary as Executing Trustee; 4.2.5. Limits to Information Intermediaries; 4.3. Control Facilitator
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4.3.1. General Aspects4.3.2. Chain of Governance; 4.3.3. (Sub- )Delegation and Remoteness; 4.3.4. Limits of Control in Practice; 4.3.5. Self-Commitment; 4.4. Risk Bearer; 4.4.1. General Aspects; 4.4.2. On Sub-Delegation and Ultimate Liability; 4.4.3. Limits to Risk Bearers; 4.4.4. On the Inherent Tension of Trust Industries; 5 Conceptual Evaluation of the Heuristic; 5.1. Framework for Evaluation; 5.2. Rigor vs. Relevance: Linking Theory and Problem; 5.3. Abstraction vs. Re-Enrichment: Linking Theory and User; 5.3.1. On the Heuristic Priming and Framing Trust Decisions
Additional Edition:
Print version: Trust, control, and the economics of governance New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. ISBN 9780367250904
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
Keywords:
Electronic books.
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Electronic books.
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Electronic books
DOI:
10.4324/9780429286018
URL:
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429286018
