UID:
edoccha_9958109982602883
Format:
1 online resource (xxiv, 756 pages) :
,
illustrations (some color).
Edition:
2nd ed.
ISBN:
0-12-810076-1
,
0-12-409596-8
,
9780124095373
Series Statement:
Elsevier insights
Content:
Other books present corporate finance approaches to the venture capital and private equity industry, but many key decisions require an understanding of the ways that law and economics work together. This revised and updated 2e offers broad perspectives and principles not found in other course books, enabling readers to deduce the economic implications of specific contract terms. This approach avoids the common pitfalls of implying that contractual terms apply equally to firms in any industry anywhere in the world. In the 2e, datasets from over 40 countries are used to analyze and con
Note:
Previous edition: London: Academic, 2009.
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Front Cover; Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting; Copyright Page; Contents; Preface; A Brief Note on Organization and Data; One: Introduction; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 What is Venture Capital and Private Equity?; 1.2 How Does Venture Capital and Private Equity Differ from Alternative Sources of Capital?; 1.3 How Large Is the Market for Venture Capital and Private Equity?; 1.4 State of the Venture Capital Market Pre- and Postfinancial Crisis; 1.4.1 The Effect of the Crisis on a Venture Capital Industry Already in Distress; 1.4.2 Crisis Leading to Opportunities?
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1.4.3 Summary1.5 What Issues Are Relevant to the Study of Venture Capital and Private Equity?; 1.5.1 Information Asymmetries and Agency Problems; 1.5.2 International Institutional and Legal Context, and Empirical Methods; 1.5.3 How to Attract Institutional Investors?; 1.5.4 How are Funds Structured?; 1.5.5 How Well Are Fund Managers Compensated?; 1.5.6 Style Drift; 1.5.7 Listed Private Equity; 1.5.8 What Role for Government?; 1.5.9 Time to Invest: The Process; 1.5.10 What Security?; 1.5.11 How Do Exit Expectations Influence Financial Contracts?
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1.5.12 How Do Legal Conditions Affect Venture Capital Governance?1.5.13 What Influences Investor Effort?; 1.5.14 Do Contracts Ensure Effort?; 1.5.15 Where to Invest?; 1.5.16 How Many Investments?; 1.5.17 Are There Diseconomies of Scale with Fund Size?; 1.5.18 Time to Divest: The Process; 1.5.19 When to Divest?; 1.5.20 What Exit Vehicle?; 1.5.21 Valuation and Disclosure; Key Terms; Discussion Questions; 2 Overview of Agency Theory, Empirical Methods, and Institutional Contexts; 2.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives; 2.2 Forms of Finance; 2.2.1 Debt; 2.2.2 Preferred Equity
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2.2.3 Common Equity2.2.4 Warrants; 2.3 Agency Problems; 2.3.1 Moral Hazard; 2.3.2 Bilateral Moral Hazard; 2.3.3 Multitask Moral Hazard; 2.3.4 Adverse Selection; 2.3.5 Free Riding; 2.3.6 Hold-Up; 2.3.7 Trilateral Bargaining; 2.3.8 Window Dressing; 2.3.9 Underinvestment; 2.3.10 Asset Stripping; 2.3.11 Risk Shifting; 2.4 Does Mitigating Agency Problems Enhance Firm Value?; 2.5 Summary and Steps Forward in Remaining Chapters; Key Terms; Discussion Questions; 3 Overview of Institutional Contexts and Empirical Methods; 3.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives
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3.2 An Overview of the International Institutional and Legal Context3.3 Statistics and Econometrics Used in This Book; 3.3.1 Why Use Statistics and Econometrics and not Case Studies?; 3.3.2 What Are the Steps in Analyzing Data?; Representativeness; Descriptive Statistics; Comparison Tests and Correlations; Regression Analyses; Robustness Checks; 3.4 Summary; Key Terms; Key Statistical and Econometric Terms; Two: Fund Structure and Governance; 4 Fundraising and Regulation; 4.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives; 4.2 Institutional Investor Objectives from Investment in Private Equity
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4.3 Regulation of Institutional Investors and Fund Managers
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English
Additional Edition:
Print version: Cumming, Douglas. Venture capital and private equity contracting. Amsterdam ; Boston : Elsevier, 2013 ISBN 1299808336
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-299-80833-6
Language:
English
