UID:
almafu_9959233108602883
Format:
1 online resource (204 p.)
ISBN:
3-11-032574-8
Series Statement:
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ; Bd. 41
Content:
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
Note:
Description based upon print version of record.
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Frontmatter --
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TABLE OF CONTENTS --
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION --
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CHAPTER II: AGAINST INTERNALISM --
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CHAPTER III: AGAINST EXTERNALISM --
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CHAPTER IV: THE VIEW OF PLATO --
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CHAPTER V: AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS --
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CHAPTER VI: PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY --
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CHAPTER VII: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES --
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BIBLIOGRAPHY --
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Backmatter
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Issued also in print.
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 3-11-032508-X
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-299-72131-1
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9783110325744
