Format:
Online-Ressource (37 p)
Edition:
Online-Ausg.
ISBN:
147550554X
,
9781475505542
Series Statement:
IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 12/204
Content:
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Annen, Kurt Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012 ISBN 9781475505542
Language:
English
DOI:
10.5089/9781475505542.001
Author information:
Annen, Kurt 1967-
