UID:
almafu_9959238039402883
Format:
1 online resource (xviii, 311 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-107-13969-4
,
1-280-41572-X
,
0-511-18136-1
,
0-511-11555-5
,
0-511-19806-X
,
0-511-29910-9
,
0-511-61445-4
,
0-511-11500-8
Content:
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Tables and Figures; Acknowledgments; CHAPTER 1 Modeling Party Competition; 1.1 Introduction to the Unified Theory of Party Competition; 1.2 Data and Methodology; 1.3. Justifying Our Theoretical Focus: Why Assume a Unified Model of Party Competition with Vote-Maximizing Parties?; 1.4 Plan of the Book; CHAPTER 2 How Voters Decide; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Policy-Only Model; 2.3 Nonpolicy Factors: The Unified Model; 2.4 The Unified Discounting Model; 2.5 Discussion; CHAPTER 3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies; 3.1 Introduction
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3.2 The Logic of Policy Competition in the Unified Spatial Model: Illustrative Examples of How Nonpolicy Considerations Matter3.3 Party Competition and the Concept of Equilibrium in Policy Strategies; 3.4 Empirical Application to the 1988 French Presidential Election; CHAPTER 4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Model; 4.3 Centrifugal Incentives for Candidate Strategies; 4.4 An Empirical Illustration; 4.5 Robustness of Equilibrium Positions to the Salience of Partisanship; 4.6 Discussion
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CHAPTER 5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Context of the 1988 French Presidential Election; 5.3 Candidate Competition under the Policy-Only Model; 5.4 Candidate Competition under a Unified Model with Nonpolicy Factors; 5.5 Candidate Competition under a Unified Discounting Model; 5.6 Conclusion; CHAPTER 6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1989 Parliamentary Election; 6.3 Party Competition in the Policy-only Model; 6.4 Party Competition in the Unified Model
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6.5 Party Competition in a Unified Discounting Model6.6 Coalition-Seeking Motivations; 6.7 Conclusion; CHAPTER 7 The Threat of Abstention; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Incorporating the Turnout Decision into the Unified Voting Model; 7.3 Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model: Illustrative Arguments; 7.4 Conclusion; CHAPTER 8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Hypotheses on Voting Behavior and Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Mode; 8.3 Candidate Competition in the 1988 American Presidential Election
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8.4 Unified Turnout Models for the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections8.5 Candidate Equilibrium under the Unified Turnout Model; 8.6 The Unified Turnout Model with Policy Discounting; 8.7 Discussion; CHAPTER 9 Policy Competition in Britain; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1997 General Election; 9.3 Party Competition under the Policy-only Model; 9.4 Party Competition under the Unified Model; 9.5 Party Competition under a Unified Turnout Model: The Strategic Effects of Abstention due to Alienation; 9.6 Conclusion
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CHAPTER 10 The Consequences of Voter Projection
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-54493-9
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-83644-1
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614453
