UID:
almafu_9960819764702883
Format:
1 online resource (80 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-009-06330-8
,
1-009-05735-9
Series Statement:
Cambridge elements. Elements in metaphysics
Content:
Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 31 Aug 2022).
,
Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Persistence -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 What Is Persistence? -- 2.1 Persistence Error Theory and Persistence Realism -- 2.2 The Semantic Claim -- 2.2.1 Endurance -- 2.2.2 How Do Things Seem to Us? -- 2.2.3 Perdurance -- 2.2.3.1 Is Endurance Different from Perdurance? -- 2.2.4 Transdurance -- 2.2.5 Exdurantism -- 2.2.6 Successionism -- 2.2.7 Processionism -- 2.2.8 Identity over Time -- 2.2.9 Recap -- 3 Persistence Error Theory -- 3.1 The Argument from Semantic Externalism -- 3.2 The Argument from Unthinkability -- 4 Semantic Processionism -- 4.1 The Sufficiency of Processions -- The Argument from Access -- The Argument from Care -- 4.2 Semantic Processionism: The Necessity Claim -- The Necessity of Processions -- 5 Objections to Semantic Processionism -- The Master Argument -- 5.1 Against the Persistence of Perduring Processions -- Master Argument: Perdurantist Version -- The Argument from Change -- 5.2 Against the Persistence of Enduring Processions -- Master Argument: Endurantist Version -- 5.2.1 The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics -- The Argument from Change, Redux -- The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics -- The Argument from Identity over Time -- 6 Persistence Realism -- The Argument for Realism -- 7 The Nature of Actual Processions -- The Argument from Prudential Rationality -- The Argument from Coincidence -- 8 Conclusion -- References.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781009056007
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009057356
