UID:
almafu_9960695416702883
Format:
1 online resource (227 p.)
ISBN:
9781626370005
Content:
In the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. politicians, policymakers, and citizens focused their desire for retribution not on the obvious target, Japan, but on Hitler's Germany. Richard Hill challenges a major point of conventional wisdom on U.S.-Axis relations to explain why the U.S. held Hitler responsible for the Japanese action—and why Hitler's December 11 declaration of war was inconsequential to the U.S. involvement in the European theater. Hill's carefully argued analysis reveals widespread acceptance in late 1941 that the route to Tokyo was through Berlin—that Germany was the overlord of Japan, as well as its co-conspirator. Despite emerging uncertainty about German guilt for Pearl Harbor, he concludes, the prevailing public opinion in the first weeks after December 7 mandated a Germany-first strategy and continued to color U.S. policy throughout the war.
Note:
Frontmatter --
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Contents --
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Acknowledgments --
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1 Introduction --
,
2 Beaten to the Punch: Hitler’s Declaration of War --
,
3 Actual Collaboration: German Guilt for Pearl Harbor --
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4 A Responsible Source: Where Were the German Military Forces? --
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5 War with the Axis: Europe Through the Backdoor --
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6 Puppetmaster --
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7 Hitler’s Fifth Column in Japan --
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8 Hitler Threatens Japanese Dupes --
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9 Nobody Knows: Better Safe Than Sorry --
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10 Conclusion: Why Did the United States Declare War on Germany? --
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Appendix: Public Opinion Polls --
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Selected Bibliography --
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Index --
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About the Book
,
In English.
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9781626370005
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626370005
URL:
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781626370005
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626370005
URL:
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781626370005
