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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Relational Contracts and Job Design (2005)
    Berlin : Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
    Details
    UID:
    edochu_18452_4570
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (35 Seiten)
    ISSN: 1860-5664
    Series Statement: 2005,52
    Content: This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.18452/3918
    URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049236
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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