Format:
Online-Ressource (175 p)
ISBN:
9780691134000
Content:
Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
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Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION; Three Misconceptions About Diplomacy; How Can a State Communicate That an Adversary Has Misjudged Its Resolve?; Overview of the Book; PART II How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate; CHAPTER 2 THE FAILURE OF CHINESE DIPLOMACY, 1950; The Chinese Attempt at Deterrence; The U.S. Dismissal of China's Threats as Bluffs; Would the United States and China Have Fought if China's Threats Had Been Credible?; Why Did the United States Dismiss China's Threats As Bluffs?
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ConclusionCHAPTER 3 A REPUTATIONAL THEORY OF DIPLOMACY; Reputations for Honesty and Reputations for Resolve; Audience Costs, Cheap Talk, and Diplomacy; The Game-Theoretic Model; Effective, Cheap Diplomacy; Conclusion; PART III Evidence That Honesty Matters; CHAPTER 4 REPUTATIONS FOR HONESTY AND THE SUCCESS OF DIPLOMACY; Central Empirical Implications of the Formal Model; Determining Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model; Data and Methodology; The Escalation of International Disputes: Tests of the Theory; Robustness of the Empirical Results; Conclusion
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CHAPTER 5 THE BROADER IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATIONS FOR HONESTYThe Effect of the Defender's Reputation on States' Decisions to Begin Militarized Disputes and to Attempt Deterrence; The Role of the Military Balance; Conclusion; PART IV Conclusion; CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION; PART V Appendixes; APPENDIX A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM; Factorization; Choosing Thresholds So That Each Player-Type Prefers Its Equilibrium Strategy to Other Strategies Played in Equilibrium; Checking That No Player Prefers to Deviate to a Strategy No Type Plays in Equilibrium
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No Player Prefers to Deviate at a Node Other Than the Player's First Node in the Stage GameAPPENDIX B THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION ON WAR AND ON WELFARE; APPENDIX C IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY; APPENDIX D THE EFFECTS OF POWER STATUS, CONTIGUITY, AND DEMOCRACY; Bibliography; Index
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781400849444
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780691134000
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Deterrence by Diplomacy
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
