Format:
1 Online-Ressource (xii, 336 pages)
,
digital, PDF file(s)
ISBN:
9780511791123
Content:
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor
Content:
Introduction -- Procedural cartel theory -- Modeling agenda power -- The primacy of Reed's rules in House organization -- Final passage votes -- The costs of agenda control -- The textbook Congress and the Committee on Rules -- The bills reported from committee -- Which way does policy move? -- Positive agenda power -- Conclusion
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780521853798
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780521619967
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780521853798
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
Keywords:
USA Congress
;
Parteipolitik
DOI:
10.1017/CBO9780511791123
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
