Format:
1 online resource (185 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9781107004368
,
9781139080750
Series Statement:
Econometric Society Monographs v.Series Number 47
Content:
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming
Note:
Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- CHAPTER 1: Introduction -- 1.1 OUTLINE -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- CHAPTER 2: Arrow's Theorem and Its Consequences -- 2.1 THE INTEGER PROGRAM -- 2.1.1 General Domains -- 2.2 SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS -- 2.2.1 Strategic Candidacy -- 2.3 MECHANISMS AND REVELATION -- CHAPTER 3: Network Flow Problem -- 3.2 NETWORK FLOW PROBLEM -- 3.3 FLOW DECOMPOSITION -- 3.4 THE SHORTEST-PATH POLYHEDRON -- 3.4.1 Interpreting the Dual -- 3.4.2 Infinite Networks -- CHAPTER 4: Incentive Compatibility -- 4.1 NOTATION -- 4.2 DOMINANT STRATEGY INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY -- 4.2.1 2-Cycle Condition -- 4.2.2 Convex Type Spaces -- 4.2.3 Convex Valuations -- 4.3 REVENUE EQUIVALENCE -- 4.3.1 A Demand-Rationing Example -- 4.4 THE CLASSICAL APPROACH -- 4.5 INTERDEPENDENT VALUES -- 4.6 BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY -- CHAPTER 5: Efficiency -- 5.1 VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM -- 5.2 COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS -- 5.4 ASCENDING AUCTIONS -- 5.4.1 Primal-Dual Algorithm -- 5.4.2 Incentives -- 5.4.3 Subgradient Algorithm -- An Ascending Implementation of the Subgradient Algorithm -- 5.5 GROSS SUBSTITUTES -- 5.6 AN IMPOSSIBILITY -- 5.7 A RECIPE -- CHAPTER 6: Revenue Maximization -- 6.1 WHAT IS A SOLUTION? -- 6.2 ONE-DIMENSIONAL TYPES -- 6.2.1 A Formulation -- 6.2.2 Optimal Mechanism for Sale of a Single Object -- Dominant Strategy -- 6.2.3 Polyhedral Approach -- Polymatroids -- 6.2.4 Ironing and Extreme Points -- 6.2.5 From Expected Allocations to the Allocation Rule -- 6.2.6 Correlated Types -- 6.2.7 The Classical Approach -- From the Discrete to the Continuous -- Interdependent Values -- 6.3 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS -- 6.3.1 The Continuous Type Case -- 6.4 ASYMMETRIC TYPES -- 6.4.1 Bargaining -- 6.5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL TYPES -- 6.5.1 Wilson's Example
,
6.5.2 Capacity-Constrained Bidders -- The BNIC Constraints -- Simplification of Incentive Constraints -- Optimal Auction Formulation and Solution -- Monotonicity and the Conditional Virtual Values -- CHAPTER 7: Rationalizability -- 7.1 THE QUASILINEAR CASE -- 7.2 THE GENERAL CASE -- References -- Index
Additional Edition:
Print version Vohra, Rakesh V. Mechanism Design New York : Cambridge University Press,c2011 ISBN 9781107004368
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
URL:
FULL
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