UID:
almafu_9958082626302883
Format:
1 online resource (xiii, 171 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-107-70304-2
,
1-139-89313-0
,
1-107-70187-2
,
1-107-66845-X
,
1-107-69180-X
,
1-107-70388-3
,
1-107-59849-4
,
1-139-62888-7
Series Statement:
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Content:
This book is the first comprehensive study of foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization. Political economy FDI research has long focused on how host-country politics influence the supply of FDI, or how firms choose to invest. By contrast, this book focuses on the politics of FDI demand: the sources of citizens' preferences for FDI inflows and countries' foreign ownership restrictions. Professor Sonal S. Pandya's theory of FDI regulation identifies how FDI redistributes income within host countries, raises local wages, and creates competition for local firms. Empirical tests also emphasize the central role of multinational cooperations' productive assets in shaping the politics of FDI. These tests feature an original dataset of annual country-industry foreign ownership regulations that spans more than one hundred countries during the period 1970-2000. This book highlights the economic and political foundations of global economic integration and supplies the tools to understand the growing economic conflicts between advanced economics and large emerging markets such as China and India.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Trading Spaces; Series; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1 The Politicization of FDI Inflows: A Brief History; 1.2 FDI Liberalization: Identifying Empirical Puzzles; 1.3 The Political Economy of FDI Regulation: Theoretical Claims and Empirical Tests; 1.4 New Perspectives on the Political Economy of FDI; 1.5 Roadmap; 2 FDI; 2.1 Why Does FDI Exist?; 2.1.1 FDI Protects Firm-Specific Assets; 2.1.2 What Firms Become Multinational Corporations?
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2.1.3 Export-Oriented versus Market-Oriented FDI: The Organization of Multinational Production2.2 The Distributive Effects of FDI Inflows: Implications of the Specific Factors Model; 2.2.1 Accounting for Alternate Mechanisms; 2.3 FDI Preferences: Increased Labor Demand and Returns to Skills; 2.4 Sources of Cross-National Variation: Political Regime Type; 2.5 Sources of Cross-Industry Variation: Organization of Production; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 FDI Regulation Weakens Control over Assets; 3.1 Instruments of FDI Regulation; 3.2 Why Local Capital Owners Profit from Restrictions on Foreign Ownership
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3.3 Ownership Regulations Reduce FDI Inflows3.4 Conclusion; 4 Individual Preferences for FDI Inflows; 4.1 Modeling Preferences: Comparing Economic and Noneconomic Factors; 4.2 Explaining FDI Preferences: Empirical Tests; 4.3 Conclusion; 5 Democratization and Cross-National FDI Liberalization; 5.1 Democratization and Foreign Ownership Liberalization: A Baseline Model; 5.2 Robustness to Alternate Explanations for FDI Liberalization; 5.3 Alternate Measures and Model Specifications; 5.4 Robustness Tests; 5.5 Conclusion; Chapter 5 Appendix
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6 The Organization of Multinational Production and Cross-Industry Variation in FDI Regulation6.1 Modeling the Frequency of Industry-Level Ownership Restrictions; 6.2 Industry-Level Regulation - Robustness Tests; 6.3 Conclusion; 7 The Politics of FDI in the Twenty-First Century; 7.1 Advancing FDI Research; 7.2 FDI and the Twenty-First-Century-Global Economy; Appendix Existing and New Measures of FDI Regulation; Bibliography; Index; Series
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-69157-5
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-04034-5
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139628884
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
