UID:
almafu_9960117536602883
Format:
1 online resource (xiii, 168 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
First edition.
ISBN:
1-316-55772-3
,
1-316-56045-7
,
1-316-49903-0
Series Statement:
Cambridge Philosophy Classics
Content:
First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Marc Lange, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers.
Note:
Includes index.
,
Cover -- Half-title -- Series information -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- Preface to this edition -- Acknowledgements -- Part I A critique of the Regularity theory -- 1 Introductory -- 1 The importance of our topic -- 2 A possible difficulty in investigating our topic -- 3 Assumptions -- 4 The Regularity theory -- 2 Critique of the Regularity theory (1): The problem of accidental uniformities -- 1 The Naive Regularity theory of law -- 2 Classification of criticisms of the Regularity theory -- 3 Single-case uniformities -- 4 How to pass from single-case uniformities to multi-case uniformities -- 5 How to pass from local uniformities to Humean uniformities -- 6 Unrealized physical possibilities -- 7 Humean uniformities with non-existent subjects -- 3 Critique of the Regularity theory (2) -- 1 Spatio-temporally limited laws -- 2 Local uniformities as laws -- 3 Infinitely qualified laws -- 4 Probabilistic laws -- 5 Probabilistic laws: The retreat to Positivism -- 6 Functional laws -- 4 Critique of the Regularity theory (3) -- 1 Lack of inner connection -- 2 Laws of nature as Principles of Explanation -- 3 The Paradoxes of Confirmation -- 4 The Problem of Counterfactuals -- 5 The Problem of Induction -- 5 Can the Regularity theory be sophisticated? -- 1 Preliminary -- 2 Epistemic restriction upon uniformities -- 3 The Resiliency solution -- 4 Systematic restrictions upon uniformities -- Part II Laws of nature as relations between universals -- 6 Laws of nature as relations between universals -- 1 The need for universals -- 2 The theory of universals -- 3 A first formulation -- 4 Laws as universals -- 5 Causation as a relation between particulars -- 6 Necessitation, universals and laws -- 7 Advantages and some disadvantages of conceiving of laws of nature as relations between universals.
,
8 Braithwaite's and Popper's argument -- 7 Functional laws -- 8 Uninstantiated laws -- 1 Tooley's cases -- 2 Tooley's conclusions -- 3 Tooley's cases solved by the introduction of powers? -- 4 A sceptical treatment of Tooley's cases -- 5 Uninstantiated laws with nomically impossible antecedents -- 9 Probabilistic laws -- 1 The form of probabilistic laws -- 2 Probabilistic laws as probabilities of necessitation -- 3 Other types of probabilistic laws -- 10 Further considerations concerning the form of laws -- 1 Scientific identification -- 2 Laws with universal scope -- 3 Are there any Exclusion laws? -- 4 Iron laws and oaken laws -- 5 Disjunctive laws -- 6 Do laws always link the properties of the same object? -- 7 Formal properties of necessitation -- 11 Are the laws of nature necessary or contingent? -- 1 Arguments for the necessity of laws -- 2 Strong Necessity -- 3 Weak Necessity -- 4 Uninstantiated laws -- Conclusions -- Works cited -- Index.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-14231-8
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-316-50709-2
Language:
English
