UID:
almafu_9961013885402883
Format:
1 online resource (XVI, 328 p.)
ISBN:
9783110772845
Series Statement:
De Gruyter Textbook
Content:
The definitive guide to the game-theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin’s security model. The book begins with an overview of probability and game theory. Nakamoto Consensus is discussed in both practical and theoretical terms. This volume: Describes attacks and exploits with mathematical justifications, including selfish mining. Identifies common assumptions such as the Market Fragility Hypothesis, establishing a framework for analyzing incentives to attack. Outlines the block reward schedule and economics of ASIC mining. Discusses how adoption by institutions would fundamentally change the security model. Analyzes incentives for double-spend and sabotage attacks via stock-flow models. Overviews coalitional game theory with applications to majority takeover attacks Presents Nash bargaining with application to unregulated environments This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system.
Note:
Frontmatter --
,
Preface --
,
Acknowledgments --
,
Contents --
,
1 Basic of cryptographic payments --
,
2 Probability spaces --
,
3 Game theory basics --
,
4 Monopolizing pool --
,
5 Basic double-spend game --
,
6 Censorship attacks --
,
7 Economics of mining --
,
8 Selfish mining --
,
9 Strategic mining --
,
10 What discourages strategic mining? --
,
11 Declining block subsidy --
,
12 The Flattening ASIC cost curve --
,
13 Attacks --
,
14 Direct frontal takeovers --
,
15 Nash bargaining --
,
16 Coalitional game theory --
,
17 Stock, flow, and economic considerations --
,
18 Bitcoin as it matures --
,
Bibliography --
,
Index
,
Issued also in print.
,
In English.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110773057
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110772838
Language:
English
Subjects:
Computer Science
,
Economics
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
