UID:
almafu_9961633092402883
Format:
1 online resource (188 pages)
Edition:
First edition.
ISBN:
3-11-078093-3
Series Statement:
Practical Philosophy Series ; Volume 26
Content:
Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.
Note:
Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Emotional Response as a Normative Guide -- Chapter 2: Feeling States and Cognitive States -- Chapter 3: Against the Identification of Normativity with Rationality -- Chapter 4: The Virtue of Flexibility and the Unity of Feeling and Cognitive Capacities -- Chapter 5: Spontaneous Aversion and Attraction in "Good Thinking" -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
,
Issued also in print.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110780826
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9783110780932
