UID:
almafu_9959237177702883
Format:
1 online resource (xxiii, 268 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-107-19548-9
,
1-283-37815-9
,
9786613378156
,
1-139-18915-8
,
1-139-16339-6
,
1-139-18787-2
,
1-139-19046-6
,
1-139-18324-9
,
1-139-18556-X
Series Statement:
Federico Caffe lectures
Content:
In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions and opens up a rich new research agenda for development studies.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Regulation and Development; Federico Caffè Lectures; Title; Copyright; Contents; Publisher's acknowledgment; Foreword; François Bourguignon; Y. Hossein Farzin; Preface; Introduction; 1 Overview of regulatory issues; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Structural issues; The structure of regulatory agencies; The structure of the industry; 1.3 Regulation of natural monopolies; The high cost of public funds; Monitoring; Hierarchical regulation and corruption; Commitment; Weakness of the rule of law; Financial constraints; Summing up; 1.4 Promoting competition by pricing access; Vertical disintegration
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One-way access with vertical integrationTwo-way access for competition in infrastructures; 1.5 Competition policy; 1.6 Universal service; 1.7 Conclusion; 2 The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 A simple model of regulation; Description; The full information benchmark; Optimal regulation without auditing of cost; Optimal regulation without transfers; Regulatory commission and capture; 2.3 Optimal regulation and the characteristics of developing countries; High cost of public funds; Regulation with transfers; Regulation without transfers
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Incentives and stages of developmentHigher propensity to corruption; 2.4 The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off in practice; 2.5 Conclusion; Appendix; 3 A positive theory of privatization; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Literature review; Governments with private agendas; 3.3 The model; 3.4 Privatization; 3.5 Testing the theory; Empirical implications; The data; Determinants of the rate of privatization; Appendix 1; Appendix 2 Proof of proposition 3.3; 4 Enforcement, regulation, and development; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Optimal regulation; 4.3 Regulation and enforcement; 4.4 Predictions of the model
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4.5 ConclusionAppendix; 5 Access pricing rules for developing countries; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 About the optimality of the market structure; 5.3 Structural separation and pricing of access to an independently owned infrastructure; Competitive usage; Examples; Market power of users; Additional problems with Ramsey pricing; Regulatory capture; Risk of expropriation; 5.4 One-way access with vertical integration; Competitive users; Example; Example; Case b; A noncompetitive entrant; 5.5 Two-way access; 5.6 Conclusion; 6 Universal service obligationsin LDCs; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The basic setting
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6.3 Optimal regulation under price discrimination6.4 Optimal regulation under uniform pricing; 6.5 Universal service policy under collusion; Collusion under discriminatory pricing; Collusion under uniform pricing; 6.6 Conclusion; Appendix; 7 Design of regulatory institutionsin developing countries; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Lessons from history in industrialized countries; The evolution of regulation until the Second World War; Nationalization as a response; The British post office and telegraph services; Railways in France; The United States' complex regulatory system; Two competition agencies
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The complexity of telecommunications regulation
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-54948-5
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-84018-X
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
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Political Science
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139163392
