UID:
almafu_9960119255302883
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 327 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
0-511-62462-X
Content:
Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated into current thinking. That is particularly true of his work on unity and on the semantic apparatus of self-awareness. The first four chapters of this book present a comprehensive overview of Kant's model for non-specialists, an overview largely unencumbered by detailed exegesis. The work then offers a close study of five major discussions of the mind in the Critique of Pure Reason and Anthropology.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
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Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- The contemporary relevance of Kant's work -- 1 Kant's contribution -- 2 Kant, functionalism, and cognitive science -- 3 The resistance of materialists -- Kant's theory of the subject -- 1 The need for a subject -- 2 'One single experience': the unity of experience -- 3 Kant's doctrine of synthesis -- 4 The unity of consciousness -- 5 The kind of unity we have -- 6 Tying it all together: the mind as a representation -- Kant's conception of awareness and self-awareness -- 1 Defining 'Bewuβtsein': outer and inner sense -- 2 Two forms of self-awareness -- 3 'Bewuβtsein': awareness without self-awareness? -- 4 What is special about apperceptive self-awareness? -- Kant's theory of apperceptive self-awareness -- 1 Transcendental designation: the referential base of self-awareness -- 2 The sources of self-awareness -- 3 The global representation: theory of the representational base -- 4 Why apperceptive self-awareness is the way it is -- 5 Coda: transcendental and empirical aspects of the self -- The mind in the Critique of Pure Reason -- 1 Kant's critical project and how the mind fits into it -- 2 The location of the subjective deduction in the first edition -- 3 The attack on the Paralogisms in the first edition: synthesis and self-awareness -- 4 The mind and its awareness of itself in the second edition -- 5 The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism -- 6 Interpretive perplexities -- The first-edition subjective deduction: the object of 'one experience' -- I Synthesis and Unity -- 1 What is a subjective deduction, and why did Kant offer one? -- 2 Kitcher and Kant's doctrine of synthesis -- 3 Apprehension, reproduction, and recognition in concepts -- 4 Apperception and the unity of individual objects.
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5 Transcendental apperception: the unity of 'all appearances' -- 6 Synchronic unity -- II The Strange Case of Self-Awareness and the Deduction -- 1 Apperception and self-awareness -- 2 Why did Kant introduce self-awareness into the deduction? -- Kant's diagnosis of the Second Paralogism -- 1 The Paralogisms -- 2 Three claims from the subjective deduction -- 3 The introductory remarks: the strategies of rational psychology -- 4 The arguments for the Second Paralogism -- 5 The fourth part of Kant's discussion -- The Third Paralogism: unity without identity over time -- 1 Situating the Third Paralogism -- 2 The structure of Kant's discussion -- 3 Does unity or memory require identity? -- 4 Kant and Hume versus Butler and Reid, and Strawson, too -- 5 To what extent is the unity of consciousness diachronic? -- 6 Unity as the form of thought: 'time is ... in me' -- 7 Identifying the subject with an object -- 8 Results and attitude -- The second-edition subjective deduction: self-representing representations -- 1 Homunculi and self-representing representations -- 2 The second-edition Transcendental Deduction -- 3 15: synthesis in the second edition -- 4 16 and 17: the new version of the central argument -- 5 The mind as representation -- 6 Self-representation and self-awareness -- 7 Mind as representation: final considerations -- Nature and awareness of the self -- 1 What the subject is and what we can know about it -- 2 Is a subject merely a formal requirement? -- 3 18: empirical versus transcendental apperception -- foundationalism -- 4 24 and 25: self-awareness and the noumenal mind -- 5 Why immediate awareness of the noumenal mind is not knowledge -- 6 Why did Kant claim that we are immediately aware of the noumenal mind? -- 7 Coda: the mind in the two versions of the deduction -- 8 Concluding remarks -- Notes -- Bibliography.
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Index of passages cited -- General index.
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-57441-2
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-45036-5
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624629
