UID:
almafu_9960117738102883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xiii, 231 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-108-12628-6
,
1-108-12916-1
,
1-108-12355-4
Inhalt:
With gridlock, presidents increasingly rely on unilateral actions - means not requiring legislative statutes - which many view as tantamount to power. Using a variety of approaches, Chiou and Rothenberg show that this need not be the case as, under many conditions, the chief executive's employment of such tools is constrained. Rather, presidents contemplating issuing executive orders are often constrained by worries about challenging the legislature and the courts. Most notably, the ability of Congress to employ extra-statutory means, involving efforts by legislators and their parties that don't require passing a law, limit how presidents utilize their discretion. Additionally, political parties can influence presidential choices and actions both by restricting the ideological direction in which presidents can push policy via discretionary authority and by agenda-setting and disciplining members in the legislative process. Nor are all presidential actions equal, as the policy area involved and the importance of an action condition presidential power.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 25 May 2017).
,
Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Thinking about Power: Theoretical Model -- 3 Not All Unilateral Actions Are Created Equal: Measuring the Significance of Executive Orders -- 4 The Race for Power: Empirically Examining Competing Models -- 5 Bringing the Parties In: Legislative Partisan Influence and Presidential Power -- 6 The Subtleties of Power: Assessing the Two Presidencies -- 7 Conclusions: Solving the Enigma of Presidential Power -- Appendix 1 Statements of Probability of Unilateral Action, Propositions 1-4 and Their Proofs -- Appendix 2 An Item-Response Model Incorporating Rater Attributes -- Appendix 3 Formal Presentation of Framework with Party Roles in Legislative Stage, Proposition 1 and Expected Incentives of Unilateral Action -- Appendix 4 Results with Party Roles in Legislative Stage for Alternative Threshold Levels -- List of References -- Index.
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-19150-5
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-316-64211-9
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108123556
