UID:
almafu_9960119390302883
Format:
1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
0-511-89603-4
Content:
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover -- Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Preliminary survey -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The structure of the model -- 1.3 Implications -- Public and private policies -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The characteristics of policies -- 2.3 Economic and accounting budgets -- 2.4 The production of public policies -- 2.5 The interests of bureaucrats -- 2.6 Conclusion -- A theory of selective behavior -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Classical theories of bureaucracy -- 3.3 Selective behavior illustrated -- 3.4 Inefficient behavior -- 3.5 The theory -- 3.6 The cost of public policies -- 3.7 Conclusion -- The accumulation of trust -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Why trust? -- 4.3 The production of trust -- 4.4 A digression inspired by the literature on trust and related phenomena -- 4.5 Networks and the equilibrium volume of trust -- 4.6 Notes on sundry topics suggested by the theory of trust -- The compensation of bureaucrats -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Monopoly models of bureaucracy in the public sector -- 5.3 Competition -- 5.4 Selective behavior and managerial competition -- The size distribution of bureaus -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Schumpeterian competition -- 6.3 Schumpeterian competition in the public sector -- 6.4 The allocation of resources among bureaus -- 6.5 Entrepreneurial capacity -- 6.6 Restrictions on competition -- 6.7 Conclusion -- Some applications -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Organizational structure and productivity -- 7.3 The Japanese firm: an ideal bureaucracy? -- 7.4 Income and price controls -- 7.5 Parkinson's Law -- Concluding observations and agenda -- 8.1 Departures -- 8.2 The way ahead -- Notes -- Index.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-07172-0
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-24589-3
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033
