Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 online resource (xvii, 339 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 1-108-80828-X , 1-108-80317-2 , 1-108-77660-4

Content: Analysts and policymakers often decry the failure of institutions to accomplish their stated purpose. Bringing together leading scholars of Latin American politics, this volume helps us understand why. The volume offers a conceptual and theoretical framework for studying weak institutions. It introduces different dimensions of institutional weakness and explores the origins and consequences of that weakness. Drawing on recent research on constitutional and electoral reform, executive-legislative relations, property rights, environmental and labor regulation, indigenous rights, squatters and street vendors, and anti-domestic violence laws in Latin America, the volume's chapters show us that politicians often design institutions that they cannot or do not want to enforce or comply with. Challenging existing theories of institutional design, the volume helps us understand the logic that drives the creation of weak institutions, as well as the conditions under which they may be transformed into institutions that matter.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 May 2020). , Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Maps -- List of Tables -- List of Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The Political Origins of Institutional Weakness -- Why Institutional Weakness Matters for Comparative Politics -- Defining Institutions -- The Concept of Institutional Weakness -- Social Norms and Institutional Strength -- Insignificance -- Types of Institutional Weakness -- Noncompliance -- State Nonenforcement -- State (In)capacity and Societal Resistance -- Instability -- Judicial Interpretation as a Source of Noncompliance and Instability -- Explaining Institutional Weakness -- Sources of (Non)compliance -- Weakness by Design: The Role of Audience Value -- Implementation Gaps: Disjunctures between Rule Writers and Power Holders -- State Capacity and Societal Resistance -- Societal Sources of Compliance -- Sources of Insignificance -- Sources of Instability: The Cost of Change -- Economic Instability -- Unstable Coalitions -- Instability Traps -- Compliance and Stability -- Conclusion -- 2 When (Electoral) Opportunity Knocks: Weak Institutions, Political Shocks, and Electoral Reforms in Latin America -- Why do Politicians Reform the Rules of the Electoral Game? -- Electoral Rule Change in Latin America -- Modeling the Survival of Electoral Rules -- The Dependent Variable: Time to Electoral Reform -- The Independent Variables: Electoral Shocks and Institutional Constraints -- Results -- Conclusion -- 3 The Stickiness of "Bad" Institutions: Constitutional Continuity and Change under Democracy -- The Objective of this Chapter -- Framework -- Crafting the Deal -- Unraveling the Deal: Constitutional Annulments and Amendments -- Looking under the Hood: Constitutional Annulments and Amendments -- The Causes of Constitutional Annulments and Amendments. , Measurement Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Measuring Constitutional Change -- Measuring Coordination Potential between Outsider Elites and the Masses -- Controls -- Empirical Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Empirical Results -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 4 Presidential Crises in Latin America -- Introduction -- Ousters and Observability -- The Political Logic of Presidential Exits -- Patterns of Presidential Crises -- Instability Traps and Institutional Spillover -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 5 Coercion Gaps -- The Coercion Gap -- Setting the Law -- Peru -- Colombia -- Enforcing the Law -- Local Forbearance -- Selecting and Sanctioning Bureaucrats -- Implications for Institutional Weakness -- 6 Aspirational Laws as Weak Institutions: Legislation to Combat Violence against Women in Mexico -- A Life Free from Violence as an "Aspirational Right" -- Aspirational Rights as Weak Institutions -- Law and Policy to Combat VAW in Mexico -- Survey Data on Compliance with VAW Laws -- Physical Domestic Abuse in Mexico -- Attitudes toward Physical Intimate Partner Abuse -- Reporting Physical Intimate Partner Abuse -- Conclusions -- 7 The Social Determinants of Enforcement: Integrating Politics with Limited State Capacity -- The Politics of Enforcement -- Nonenforcement by Forbearance: Gold Mining Cooperatives in Bolivia -- Nonenforcement by Standoff: Brickmakers in Argentina -- Blocked Enforcement: Illegal and Informal Mining in Peru -- Selective Enforcement: Environmental Regulation in Santa Fe, Argentina -- Coproduced Enforcement: Business and the State Against Construction Racketeering in Peru -- Conclusion -- 8 A Multilevel Approach to Enforcement: Forest Protection in the Argentine Chaco -- Enforcement in Multilevel Systems. , The National Forest Protection Regime: National Design and Subnational Implementation in the Core Chaco Provinces -- Designing the NFPR -- Subnational Implementation of the NFPR -- Consistency of Provincial Rules with the NFPR -- Enforcement of the NFPR -- Explaining Governors' Implementation Choices -- Large Producers -- Conservationist Coalitions -- Governors' Choices: Implementation as Conflict Avoidance -- Multilevel Dynamics in Salta -- Salta's Organized Interests and the Design of the NFPR -- Designing Salta's OTBN -- Enforcing the NFPR in Salta -- Conclusion -- 9 What/Whose Property Rights?: The Selective Enforcement of Land Rights under Mexican Liberalism -- The Politics of Enacting and Enforcing Liberal Land Laws -- The Reform Period (1855-1875) -- Disentailment of Corporate Lands -- The Enclosure of Public Lands -- The Porfiriato (1876-1910) -- Disentailment of Corporate Lands -- Enclosures of Public Lands -- Judicial Cases and the Motivations for Selective Enforcement -- General Trends in Judicial Cases on Land Conflicts -- Type of Petitioners and Rate of Success -- Collective Petitioners -- Individual Petitioners -- Different Types and Levels of Enforcement -- Challenged Authorities -- Amparo Judicial Enforcers -- Conclusion -- 10 Imported Institutions: Boon or Bane in the Developing World? -- Intellectual Context -- Case Selection -- A Demanding Test -- An Exogenous Shock -- A Staged Innovation -- Longitudinal Data Analysis -- Discussion -- The Externalization of Monitoring -- The Deepening of Democracy -- The Size of the Agency -- The Skill and Solidarity of the State Agents -- Conclusion -- 11 Social Origins of Institutional Strength: Prior Consultation over Extraction of Hydrocarbons in Bolivia -- Introduction -- Alternative Arguments -- Institutional Strength as Societal Compliance and State Enforcement. , Political Incorporation of Mobilized Social Actors -- Methodology and Case Selection -- Process Tracing of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- The Contentious Adoption of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- Indigenous Political Incorporation and Institutional Strengthening of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- Conclusion -- 12 Conclusion -- Measuring Institutional Weakness -- Measuring Noncompliance -- Direct Observation of Violations -- Observation of Sanctions -- Measuring Enforcement Effort -- Coproduction as an Indirect Measure of Compliance -- Measuring Insignificance -- Measuring Instability -- The Counterfactual Benchmark -- The Persistence of Institutional Weakness in Latin America -- Conclusion: From Institutional Weakness to Institutional Weakening -- Bibliography -- Index.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-108-48933-8

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108776608