UID:
almahu_9949285263002882
Format:
XXII, 126 p. 26 illus.
,
online resource.
Edition:
1st ed. 2010.
ISBN:
9783642041532
Series Statement:
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 635
Content:
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
Note:
Games and Political Decisions -- Committees as Representative Institutions -- Robust Equal Representation -- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.
In:
Springer Nature eBook
Additional Edition:
Printed edition: ISBN 9783642041921
Additional Edition:
Printed edition: ISBN 9783642041525
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2
