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    UID:
    edoccha_9959310781902883
    Format: 1 online resource (29 pages)
    ISBN: 1-4843-5138-X , 1-4843-5141-X
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers
    Content: Countries increasingly rely on independent fiscal councils to constrain policymakers’ discretion and curb the bias towards excessive deficits and pro-cyclical policies. Since fiscal councils are often recent and heterogeneous across countries, assessing their impact is challenging. Using the latest (2016) vintage of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, we focus on two tasks expected to strengthen fiscal performance: the preparation or assessment of forecasts, and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules. Tentative econometric evidence suggests that the presence of a fiscal council is associated with more accurate and less optimistic fiscal forecasts, as well as greater compliance with fiscal rules.
    Note: Cover -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Fiscal Council Dataset -- A. Background -- B. Recent Trends -- III. How Effective are Fiscal Councils? -- A. Do IFCs Reduce Forecasting Biases? -- B. Do IFCs Improve the Precision of Forecasts? -- C. Do IFCs Foster Compliance with Numerical Fiscal Rules? A First Pass at the Data -- IV. Conclusion -- Appendix 1. Nuts and Bolts of the Fiscal Council Dataset -- References -- Tables -- 1. IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, 2016 Vintage-3 Cuts at the Data -- 2. Regressions for Forecasting Errors in Real GDP Growth -- 3. Regressions for Forecasting Errors in the Primary Balance -- 4. Regressions for Absolute Forecasting Errors in Real GDP Growth -- 5. Regressions for Absolute Forecasting Errors in the Primary Balance -- 6. Distribution of the Compliance Gap for Three Types of Fiscal Rules -- 7. Explaining Rule Compliance (Expenditure and Budget Balance Rules) -- 8. Explaining Rule Compliance: Adding Political Variables -- Figures -- 1. Number of Independent Fiscal Councils in the World -- 2. Fiscal Councils Remit -- 3. Channels of Influence -- 4. Fiscal Councils: Aspects of Legal and Operational Independence -- 5. Average Forecasting Errors -- 6. Average of Absolute Forecasting Errors.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4843-4828-1
    Language: English
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