Format:
267 Seiten
,
Kt.
ISBN:
9780801482441
,
0801482445
Series Statement:
Cornell studies in security affairs
Content:
Military bias and offensive strategy -- France : offensive strategy as an institutional defense -- France : Du Picq, Dreyfus, and the errors of plan -- Germany : the elusive formula for decisive victory -- Germany : the "necessary" is possible -- Russia : bureaucratic politics and strategic priorities -- Russia : the politics and psychology of overcommitment -- The determinants of military strategy.
Content:
Provides an interpretation of the disastrous offensives of August 1914 by the military strategists of Europe's major continental powers and why they choose to defy the inexorable constraints of time, space, and technology, which so heavily favored the defensive. Explained are their strategic doctrines in terms of three components: rational calculation, bias that reflects the influence of parochial interests on perception and policy, and bias that results from the need to simplify complex decisions. Using the role of doctrinal and organizational biases in military decision making and operational planning, the author attempts to solve one of history's great unsolved puzzles.
Note:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 255-261) and index
,
First printing, Cornell paperbacks
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0801416574
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780801416576
Language:
English
Subjects:
History
