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Format: 1 online resource (394 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521551847 , 9780511164170

Series Statement: Churchill Lectures in Economics Series

Content: A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used

Note: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Foreword -- CHAPTER ONE: Getting to Work -- 1.1 Politics Sets the Stage -- 1.2 Designing for Multiple Goals -- 1.2.1 Substitutes and Complements -- 1.2.2 New Zealand's Rights Auction -- 1.2.3 Better Auction Designs -- 1.2.4 The FCC Design and Its Progeny -- 1.3 Comparing Seller Revenues -- 1.4 The Academic Critics -- 1.4.1 Resale and the Coase Theorem -- 1.4.2 Mechanism Design Theory -- 1.4.3 Theory and Experiment -- 1.4.4 Practical Concerns -- 1.5 Plan for This Book -- REFERENCES -- PART ONE: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH -- Formalities of the Mechanism Design Model -- The Chapters of Part I -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER TWO: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms -- 2.1 Formulation -- Definition -- 2.2 Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies -- 2.3 Balancing the Budget -- 2.4 Uniqueness -- 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction -- 2.5.1 Practical Disadvantages -- 2.5.2 Monotonicity Problems -- 2.5.3 The Merger-Investment Disadvantage -- 2.6 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER THREE: The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence -- 3.1 Hotelling's Lemma -- 3.2 The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form -- 3.3 Quasi-linear Payoffs -- 3.3.1 Holmstrom's Lemma -- 3.3.2 The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem -- 3.3.3 Myerson's Lemma -- 3.3.4 Revenue Equivalence Theorems -- 3.3.5 The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem -- 3.3.5.1 Application: Auctions Versus Lotteries -- 3.3.6 The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems -- 3.3.7 Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- Definitions -- 3.3.8 The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem -- 3.3.9 Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem -- 3.3.10 Matthews' Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence -- 3.4 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER FOUR: Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences -- 4.1 The Single Crossing Conditions , 4.1.1 The Monotonic Selection Theorem -- 4.1.2 The Sufficiency Theorem -- 4.1.3 The Constraint Simplification Theorem -- 4.1.4 The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem -- 4.2 Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies -- 4.2.1 The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price -- 4.2.2 The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction -- 4.2.3 The War of Attrition Auction -- 4.2.4 The All-Pay Auction -- 4.3 Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model -- 4.3.1 Payoff Equivalence without Revenue Equivalence -- Risk Averse Sellers -- Risk Averse Bidders -- 4.3.2 Budget Constraints -- 4.3.3 Endogenous Quantities -- 4.3.4 Correlated Types -- 4.4 Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- 4.4.1 Myerson's Theorem -- Examples -- 4.4.2 Bulow-Klemperer Theorem -- 4.4.3 The Irregular Case -- 4.5 Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders -- 4.6 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER FIVE: Interdependence of Types and Values -- 5.1 Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"? -- 5.1.1 Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types -- 5.1.2 Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private -- 5.1.3 Types Are Statistically Independent -- 5.2 Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- 5.3 Wilson's Drainage Tract Model -- 5.3.1 Equilibrium -- 5.3.2 Profits and Revenues -- 5.3.3 Bidder Information Policy -- 5.3.4 Seller Information Policy -- 5.4 Correlated Types and Interdependent Values -- 5.4.1 Affiliation -- 5.4.2 The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models -- 5.4.2.1 The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal Information -- 5.4.2.2 The Button Auction with Maximal Information -- 5.4.2.3 Some Revenue Comparisons -- 5.4.3 First-Price Auctions -- 5.5 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER SIX: Auctions in Context -- 6.1 The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant -- 6.2 Symmetric Models with Costly Entry -- 6.2.1 Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry , 6.2.1.1 Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions -- 6.2.1.2 Setting the Reserve Price -- 6.2.2 Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors -- 6.2.2.1 Pre-qualifying Bidders -- 6.2.2.2 Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices -- 6.2.2.3 Buy Prices -- 6.3 Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition -- 6.3.1 Example of Set-asides -- 6.3.2 Example of Bidding Credits -- 6.3.3 Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes -- 6.3.4 Premium Auctions -- 6.3.5 Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design -- 6.4 After the Bidding Ends -- 6.4.1 Bankruptcy and Non-performance -- 6.4.2 Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids -- 6.5 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- PART TWO: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER SEVEN: Uniform Price Auctions -- 7.1 Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 7.1.1 Demand Reduction -- 7.1.2 Low-Price Equilibria -- 7.2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions -- 7.2.1 The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian Tatonnement -- Notation and Definitions -- 7.2.2 Clock Auctions -- 7.2.3 Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions -- 7.2.3.1 The Basic Clock Auction Model -- 7.2.3.2 The Alternating-Move Clock Auction -- 7.2.3.3 Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply -- 7.3 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER EIGHT: Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding -- 8.1 Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems -- 8.1.1 Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs -- 8.1.2 Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle -- Definitions -- 8.1.3 When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core? -- 8.1.4 Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes -- 8.1.5 Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes -- 8.2 Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions -- 8.2.1 Formulation -- 8.2.2 Profit-Target Strategies -- 8.2.3 Equilibrium and the Core -- 8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions -- 8.3.1 The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets , 8.3.1.1 Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes -- 8.3.1.2 Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium -- 8.3.1.3 The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes -- 8.3.2 The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction -- 8.4 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- Bibliography -- Author Index -- Subject Index

Additional Edition: Print version Milgrom, Paul Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2004 ISBN 9780521551847

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

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