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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Optimal Executive Compensation When Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion (2010)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)178123339X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: This paper studies a continuous-time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric Brownian motion firm size. The changing firm size generates partial incentives, analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff. When the agent is as patient as investors, performance-based stock grants implement the optimal contract. Our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns, and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms. That the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the CEO's historical performance-rather than current performance-lends support to our model
    Note: In: The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 859-892, 2009 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 2009 erstellt , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
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    GBV
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion (2007)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781606676
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (35 p)
    Content: This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation by studying a continuous-time agency model where the agent controls the drift of the geometric Brownian motion firm size. In contrast to existing agency models with constant firm size setting, in our model the changing firm size generates partial incentives, analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff. Along the optimal path, necessary additional incentives are provided by the optimal contract. When the agent is as patient as investors, performance-based stock grants implement the optimal contract; we also characterize the optimal contracting with shirking for this case. Our model generates a leverage effect on the firm's equity returns, and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms. That the empirical evidence pertaining to grants-performance sensitivity shows that CEO compensation is largely based on historical performance - rather than current performance - lends support to our model
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2007 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.698421
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Sale of Multiple Assets With Private Information (2008)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781517223
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
    Content: By generalizing the Leland and Pyle (1977) model to the case of multiple correlated assets, this paper studies the signaling and hedging behavior of an intermediary who sells multiple assets in financial markets. Based on information asymmetry, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of risk management and asset selling for intermediaries, and obtains several testable empirical implications. For instance, an intermediary with a more diversified underlying portfolio will face greater liquidity (a smaller price impact) when selling assets to the market. Several applications are discussed, including bank loan sales and selling mechanisms
    Note: In: AFA 2006 Boston Meetings , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 11, 2008 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Immunomarquage direct sur l'endothélium cornéen monté à plat : Enquête sur la morphologie, le cycle cellulaire et la cellule souche de l'endothélium cornéen par l'immunomarquage (2015)
    Saarbrücken : Presses Académiques Francophones
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-101)1073151492
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Edition: 1. Aufl.
    ISBN: 9783841625342 , 3841625347
    Note: Lizenzpflichtig. - Vom Verlag als Druckwerk on demand und/oder als E-Book angeboten
    Language: French
    URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-20150630358
    URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-20150630358
    URL: https://d-nb.info/1073151492/34
    URL: https://www.presses-academiques.com
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    DNB
  • 5
    Article
    Article
    Dynamic compensation contracts with private savings (2012)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)715985884
    Format: graph. Darst.
    ISSN: 0893-9454
    In: The review of financial studies, Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, 1988, 25(2012), 5 vom: Mai, Seite 1494-1549, 0893-9454
    In: volume:25
    In: year:2012
    In: number:5
    In: month:05
    In: pages:1494-1549
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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    GBV
  • 6
    Article
    Article
    A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure (2011)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)666073236
    Format: graph. Darst.
    ISSN: 0304-405X
    In: Journal of financial economics, Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1974, 100(2011), 2 vom: Mai, Seite 351-366, 0304-405X
    In: volume:100
    In: year:2011
    In: number:2
    In: month:05
    In: pages:351-366
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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    Article
    GBV
  • 7
    Article
    Article
    Optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric Brownian motion (2009)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)594747872
    Format: graph. Darst.
    ISSN: 0893-9454
    In: The review of financial studies, Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, 1988, 22(2009), 2 vom: Feb., Seite 859-892, 0893-9454
    In: volume:22
    In: year:2009
    In: number:2
    In: month:02
    In: pages:859-892
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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    Article
    GBV
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Sale of Multiple Assets with Private Information (2010)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1793235708
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: By generalizing the Leland and Pyle (1977) model to the case of multiple correlated assets, this paper studies the signaling and hedging behavior of an intermediary who sells multiple assets in financial markets. Based on information asymmetry, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of risk management and asset selling for intermediaries, and obtains several testable empirical implications. For instance, an intermediary with a more diversified underlying portfolio will face greater liquidity (a smaller price impact) when selling assets to the market. Several applications are discussed, including bank loan sales and selling mechanisms
    Note: In: The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 11, pp. 4787-4820, 2009 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2009 erstellt , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: English
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    GBV
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2010)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781259577
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (40 p)
    Series Statement: AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
    Content: This paper studies the optimal compensation problem between shareholders and the agent in a general cash-flow setup, and offers a framework to quantitatively assess the impact of agency problems. Under the structural model of capital structure studied in Leland (1994), we find that the debt-overhang effect on the endogenous managerial incentives lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with the data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller firms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During financial distress, a firm's cash-flow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. The implications on credit spreads and debt covenants are also considered
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 19, 2010 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1107019
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Guiding Blind Funds to Banks in Need : The Role of Nontransaction Deposits During Liquidity Crises (2007)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781602913
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (44 p)
    Content: This paper studies the critical role of nontransaction deposits during and after liquidity crises. In contrast to Gatev and Strahan (2005) who document that the voluntary transaction deposits inflow toward banking system offsets the banks' funds outflow from their loan commitment take-downs, we show that bank heterogeneity, especially due to size differences, leads to a funding imbalance within the banking system. This leaves some institutions with a funding shortage, and the interest-bearing property of nontransaction deposits enables active liability management among banks via a price mechanism. As a result, blind money is guided to banks in need in the form of nontransaction funds. We construct both price and quantity measures for individual bank's nontransaction deposits, and using loan commitments as a contractual binding instrument we show that banks face a non-frictionless financing market for nontransaction funds. However, the cost is far from prohibitive. This suggest that banks, thanks to the NA management, are in a favorable position to provide liquidity when the market refuses to do so, even after taking into account long-run and potentially amplifying competition for nontransaction funds. Nevertheless during liquidity crises we find negative evidence regarding the advantage of banks over finance companies, which is opposite to Gatev and Strahan (2005)
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2007 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.890024
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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